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1.0 Macroeconomic Structure 
A brief explanation of the historical basis of the country's 
economic structure is necessary for the understanding of that 
structure and the assessment of the efficacy of economic policies 
implemented within that structure. This capsule history will be 
organized around the four balance of payments crises that the 
country has experienced since 1946, Then a brief explanation of 
the economic structure will be presented. 
The 1949 balance of payments crisis marked the exhaustion of 
the war rehabilitation funds that the Philippines had used to 
finance a deficit in an international trade dominated by 
. agricultural exports and manufactured imports a pattern 
carried over from the colonial period. The first crisis forced 
the government to take more responsibility for the management of 
the economy. A Central Bank was then created and a period of 
import-substitution-—that lasted until the second crisis was 
inaugurated. 
1.1 Import-substitution 
The import-substitution regime of import controls and high 
tariffs saw GDP growing by an average of 6.2 percent annually and 
gross domestic capital formation by an average of 7.0 percent per 
year. The dominance of finished products in the import structure 
was replaced by the indispensability of intermediate industrial 
inputs. The policy created manufacturing sector dominated by 
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final processing and packing industries, many of these by U.S. 
corporations under a treaty that extended national eights to U.S. 
citizens. 
Export earnings continued to rely heavily on agricultural 
and extractive gcsods while foreign exchange demands actually 
increased due to heightened demand for imports and the profit 
remittance requirements of U.S. companies. The 1962 crisis laid 
bare the unsustainability of the import-substitution strategy as 
then implemented. 
The 1962 IMF adjustment program involved a 50 percent 
devaluation of the Philippine peso and the dismantling of the 
import control system. Merchandise exports, now significantly 
augmented by the exports of mineral products (such as copper 
concentrates) and logs, grew by 30.8 percent in 1963 and by an 
average of 4.4 percent pet year until 1967 when exports began to 
stagnate again. 
In this period, GDP growth rate fell to 5.1 percent per year 
while the population growth rate had increased to 3.0 percent per 
year. Overspending by the government occasioned by the 1969 
reelection campaign of Mr. Marcos precipitated the third balance 
of payments_crisis in 197p« 
The 1970 IMF sponsored adjustment program required a 43 
percent devaluation and the reduction in selected tariff rates. 
The reforms effectively brought to an end a brief and half-
hearted flirtation with export-led growth. The actual reality of 
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'export-led' growth was the diversification of exports toward 
other primary products,; especially lumber, but not toward labor 
absorbing manufactured goods. 
What -was inaugurated in response to the 1970 crisis was a 
policy regime; that was still nominally and even more vocally 
export-oriented. This could not be avoided since during the 
period until the next crisis in 1983, the country's economic 
management was supervised within successive IMP standby 
arrangements. This was a period however of increasing 
overvaluation of the peso, which was made possible, ironically, 
by the consistent support of the IMF and the World Bank to the 
country's economic management. 
The: support of these organizations, coupled with the 
installation of an authoritarian government in 1972, gave the 
country almost unlimited access to foreign savings in the decade 
of the 1970s.<1> It would not be inaccurate to say that the 
country enjoyed a foreign exchange bonanza in the 1970s. 
The real effective exchange rate consistently appreciated by 
a total of 18.1 percent between 1972 and 1982 (see Table 1.1 and 
Pante [1983]). There was an apparent export diversification as 
the share of so-called non-traditional exports increased from 
18.7 percent in 1983 to 55.4 percent in 1978 and 61.2 percent in 
1973 (Table 1.2). 
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Table 1.1 
NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES: 
PHILIPPINES, 1970-1984 
(1973 = 100) 
Nominal Effective Real Effective 
Year; Exchange Rate Index Exchange Rate1 Index 
1970 85.94 98.89 
1971 92.44 L03.64 
1972 97.09 L07.18 
1973 100.00 LOO.00 
1974 99.82 83.79 
1975 104.87 92.34 
197 e 103.48 89.03 
1977 101.68 86.86 
1978 103.60 88.31 
1979 105.46 85.84 
1980 109.31 87.16 
1981 111.05 87.17 
1982 115.68; 87.74 
1983 145.95 92.66 
1984* 196.20* 96.85* 
* 
Using the exchange rates data for 2nd quarter 
of 1984 and assuming a 50% change in Philippine GDP 
deflator and a 5% change in the GDP deflator of US, 
Australia, Japan, France, Germany, Canada, United 
Kingdom. 
Source: Table IV.1 of Lamberte, Montes and others L1985]. 
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Table 1.2 
PRINCIPAL MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 
1984 TO 1936 
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION 
At Current Prices At Constant Prices 
I t e m s 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 
TOTAL MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
PRINCIPAL MERCHANDISE 
EXPORTS 73.01 70.34 69.14 70.01 66.06 67.32 
1Semiconductors and 
electronic microcircuits 23.43 21.44 17.18 26.64 17.29 16.04 2. Garments 11.48 13.76 15.43 11.47 14.42 15.27 3. Crude coconut oil 10;09 7.26 6.93 - 4.10 5.43 9.63 4. Copper concentrates 2.14 1.87 1.95 4.27 3.18 3.60 5. Centrifugal sugar 5.34 3.22 2.08 7.45 3.70 1.83 6. Lumber 2.03 2.01 2.15 1.27 1.42 1.20 7. Gold from copper ores 1.98 2.21 3.45 0.65 0.83 1.03 8. Iron agglomerates 
(sinters) 2.01 2.10 1.80 1.03 1.21 0.94 9. Banana 2.27 2.51 2.88 1.88 2.18 2.17 10. Dessicated coconut 2.01 1.67 0.92 0.72 0.72 0.67 11. Copra oil, cake & meal 0.75 0.79 1.57 0.69 0.98 1.61 12. Plywood 0.98 1.03 1.12 0.73 0.83 0.75 13. Canned pineapple 1.67 1.96 1.86 1.26 1.61 1.37 14. Prepared tuna 0.84 1.04 1.11 1.28 1.71 1.65 15. Coffee, hot roasted 1.44 1.54 2.56 0.99 1.10 1.35 16» Bars, rods, unworked. 
copper 2.06 3.70 3.49 4.06 7.86 6.69 17. Shrimps and prawns 0.66 1.38 2.07 0.72 1.09 1.24 18. Logs 1.84 0.87 0.57 0.79 0.50 0.28 
Others 26.99 29.66 30.86 29.99 33.94 32.68 
Source: National Accounts Staff, December 1986. 
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This apparent export diversification was not accompanied by 
changes in the domestic manufacturing sector. Alburo [1985] shows 
i • ' 
how in the same period, the ratio of manufacturing value added to 
real domestic product stayed flat at about 23 percent and the 
real growth rate of manufacturing was falling. The export 
'diversification' had depended heavily on products whose domestic 
value added was very small - — specially in electronic chips and 
garments. 
The extent of capital flight that had occurred during the 
foreign exchange bonanza became apparent only when the crisis 
struck in 1983 and only after a thorough accounting had become 
inescapable. The sum of current account deficits from 1970 
through 1983 was $15.3 billion. In September 1983, the officially 
reported figures for the total foreign debt was $16.3 billion 
which seemed to account for a relatively small capital flight of 
only $0.9 billion. The latter figure was also not very far off 
from an estimate based on the sum of errors and omissions of $1.0 
billion from 1970 to 1982. 
The fact that the Central Bank had been borrowing heavily on 
a short-term basis on its account, principally to finance oil 
imports<2>, became public only in November 1983 when the total 
external debt of the country was reported to be $24.8 billion. 
Compared to the sum of current account deficits since 1970, the 
new figure implies a capital flight of $9.3 billion, about 37.5 
percent of the .external debt. 
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Slayton and Thompson [1985] documents how the authoritarian 
government consistently failed to achieve the IMF program targets 
during this period. For example, an increase in the tax effort 
from 13 to 16 percent was a target of the 1976 to 1978 program. 
In the program period, the government achieved an increase from 
13.1 to 13.9. When that program ended, the IMF began negotiating 
and agreed to a new standby program anyway. 
During this period, the recovery of the GDP growth rate to 
5.7 percent was driven not by export growth, nor by domestic 
structural reforms, but by the inflow of foreign debt. For this 
reason, it is useful to refer to the period after the 1970 crisis 
and before the 1983 crisis as the period of debt-driven growth. 
1.2 Debt-driven Growth 
The 1983 balance of payments crisis signalled the.end of the 
debt-driven growth period, an end which can be blamed not only on 
the drying up of inexpensive international credit/which affected 
all countries, but also on the failure of the investment strategy 
in the previous period to carry put internal changes in the 
economy (see Table 1.3). 
The trade surplus experienced in 1973 as a result of the 
commodity boom in that year turned into deficit immediately in 
the following year, the year of the first oil shock. Th^ 
seemingly good export performance in the years when no recessions 
were occurring in the First wcrld masks the fact that net exports 
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Table 1.3 
Trade Balance Trends 
Merchandise 
Growth Rate bt Trade Balance Terms of Trade 
Merchandise (Dofi c i t) Level Change Year Exports Import s as Pet to GNP (1972=100) (Percent 
1970 24.3 -3. 7 (0. 4) n. a. 1971 7.0 8. B ( 0. 6) n, a. 
1972 -2.7 , . 3 -. 7 (1.3) 100,0 
1973* 70,6 29. 8 113.3 13. 3 1974+ 44.5 96.9 (2.8) 114.5 1.1 
1975 -15,8 10.1 (7.4) 87. 8 -23.3 1976 12.2 5. 1 (5.9) 77. 7 -11.5 1977 22.4 7.7 (3. 7) - 71.0 
197S# 8.7 20. 9 (5.4) 78. 4 10.4 
1979 "34 „ 3 29. 8 (5. 2) 86. 6 10. 5 1900 25.8 25. 8 (5.5) 76. 7 -11.4 1981 & -1.1 2. 8 (5, B) 79. 0 3. 0 .1982 -12.3 -3.5 (6.7) 72, 9 -7. 7 1983 -0.3 ^ (7.3) 60.8 — 16.6 
1984 7.7 -18. 9 (2. 1 ). 59.8 -1.6 1985 -14.2 — IS. 7 (1.5) 55..1 -7 . 9 
•Commodity boom 
+ First, oil shoe k 
#SecC3rid o,i. 1 shoek 
SfMorietari st recessi on.. 
Source o-f basic data: Central Bank of the Philippines 
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continued to depend heavily on agricultural and primary products. 
The growth in non-traditional exports induced increased imports 
of necessary inputs Whose domestic production had not been 
provided for in the earlier import-substitution era. 
However, due to the poor investment policies of the Marcos 
regime (see De Dios, '1984), the accompanying debt inflow did not 
materially change the structure of the economy from that 
inherited from the end of the import-substitution period. In 
fact, prospects for growth had worsened because there was now a 
higher capital-output ratiQ (from 4 before 1980 to approximately 
10 for 1980-83) and a higher level of foreign debt (4.9 times 
merchandise exports in 1982). Table 1.4 presents the distribution 
of the foreign debt of the Philippines when the balance of 
payments crisis began in 1983. 
The outstanding external debt in October 1983 at the start 
of the 1983 crisis was 72.7 percent of GNP. The debt service 
ratio at that point in time was 35.7 percent. Of the total debt, 
37.4 percent was short-term and 60.0 percent was owed to 
commercial banks. The public sector had been the borrower for 
48.2 percent of the debt and the Central Bank had been the 
borrower for an additional 16.4 percent. 
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Table 1.4 
TOTAL EXTERNAL LIABILITIES 
(In Million US $) 
1 9 8 3 1984 1985 
Dec 31 
Projection 
I t e m Oct 17 Dec 31 Dec 31 1986 Dec 31 
By Type of Debt 
Medium- and long-term 
IMP 
Others 
Short-term 
Trade 
Non-trade 
24,095 
15,080 
1,186 
13,894 
9,015 
4,469 
4,546 
24,816 
14,412 
1,166 
14,246 
9,404 
4,614 
4,790 
25,418 
15,926 
973 
14,953 
9,492 
5,274 
4,218 
26,252 
17,679 
1,232 
16,447 
8,573 
4,854 
3,719 
27,097 
21,671 
1,146 
20,525 
5,426 
4,452 
974 
By Borrower 
Non-banking system 
Public 
Private 
Banking system 
Central Bank 
Commercial banks 
24,095 
16,077 
11,606 
4,471 
8,018 
3,962 
4,056 
24,816 
16,521 
11,802 
4,719 
8,295 
. 3,971 
4,324 
25,418 
17,188 
12,341 
4,847 
8,230 
4,113 
4,117 
26,252 
17,376 
12,358 
5,018 
8,876 
5,923 
2,953 
27,097 
le^OSj^ • • 
• • 
10,491 
7,155. 
3,336 
By Creditor 
Commercial banks 
Other financial 
Suppliers 
Multilateral 
Bilateral 
Export credit 
Others 
24,095 
14,427 
1,013 
2,682 
3,775 
2,058 
567 
1,491 
24,816 
14,674 
1,014 
2,885 
3,996 
2,108 
575 
1,533 
25,418 
14,721 
1.089 
3,103 
4.090 
2,276 
656 
1,620 
26,252 
14,474 
795 
3,264 
4,486 
2,860 
786 
2,074 
27,097 
15,179 
998 
2,541 
4,820 
3,559 
Others 140 139 139 373 • • 
Balances before adjustment of Central Bank assumed liabilities. 
and two-thiidfy; S C h e d U l e d P a r i S C l u b a c c o ™ t s (inclusive of arrears ana two thirds of downpayment on interest payable in 1986 and 1987? 
Source; Central Bank of the Philippines, Quarterly Economic and 
Financial Report, December 1985. 
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We now briefly describe the structure of the economy. 
1.3 Important Characteristics of the Philippine Economy 
1.3.1 Output and Demand 
Agriculture produces 26 percent of GDP and is dominated by 
tenancy-based production. Population pressure has also generated 
significant numbers of landless agricultural workers in the rural 
areas. Agricultural products are of two kinds: (l) products that 
are primarily for domestic consumption such as rice, corn, and 
vegetables and (2) products for exports, notably coconut products 
and sugar. 
In the period leading up to the crisis, agriculture suffered 
from unfavorable terms of trade vis-a-vis industry (see David 
[1983] and Table 1.5), low incomes and low productivity growth of 
peasants. 
The country achieved rice self-sufficiency in the 1970s with 
the diffusion of high yielding (fertilizer and pesticide 
dependent) rice varieties, but continued population pressure 
could endanger self-sufficiency in the future. Thus, one might 
say that the country is only barely self-sufficient in food. 
The subsidy coming from agriculture into other sectors was 
made heavier by the government fertilizer policy which priced 
fertilizer so that the capital costs of locally produced 
fertilizer could be recovered. Between 1973 and 1980, farmers 
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Table 1.5 
INDUSTRIES RANKED ACCORDING TO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION RATE (EPR), 
SHARE OF'EMPIX)YMENTTO TOTAL MANUFACTURING AND 
DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION IN MEtRO MANILA, 
1980 
Sector EPR 
% of Employment 
to Total 
Manufacturing 
% of. Establishment 
in Metro Manila 
High EPR Industries , 
Meat products, canning and preserving of fruits 
Articles of pulp, paper and paperboard 
Rice, corn and other grain mill products 
Softdrinks and other beverages 
Soap and other washing and cleansing compounds 
Other made-up textile goods 
Miscellaneous manufacture . 
ffanufacture of bakery products, cocoa, chocolate 
sugar confectionary, dessicated coconut, ice, 
coffee and other manufacturing 
Other fabricated metal products 
Dairy products 
Tobacco products Batteries, and other electric machinery apparatus, 
appliances and supplies 
Glass and glass products 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Pulp, paper and paperboard manufacturing 
Other chemical products 
Plastic materials 
Printing, bookbinding and other allied products 
Paint, varnishes and related compounds 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 
Fats and oils 
Manufacture of ceiftent 
Manufacture pf rubber products 
Manufacture of transport' equipment 
Textile and knitting mill products 
Manufacture of machineries except electrical 
Basic ferrous metal industries_ Manufacture of industrial chemicals 
Office, computing and accounting machines 
(excluding electrical) 
Petroleum refineries and other petroleum products 
Sugar nulling and refining 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations 
Industries with negative EPR, 1980 
Footwear Other wopd, cane and cork products . 
Furnitures and fixtures 
Manufacture of veneer, plywood and other lumber 
Fabricated structural metal products 
Other wearing apparel 
Leather and other leather products except for 
footwear and: other wearing apparel 
635.1 
158.5 
137.2 
106,1 
2.2 
3.8 
4.7 
2.8 
Share of Mfg. Employment _ 1,814,000 
Ibtai Philippines 16,434, ( 
20.1 
56.0 
5.0 
2.9 
98.5 0.5 80.6 
93.3 2.4 7.7 
90,7 1.17 23.5 
72.3 8.3 22.8 
68.4 4.0 19.3 
62.3 0.6 17.1 
61.8 1.7 73.3 
58.8 4.6 79.2 
54.6 0.7 66.3 , 
S4.3 1.9 11.9 
47.5 , 1.7 . 71.4 
47.0 3.5 79.1 
44.3 2.0 83.1 
39.6 2.1 53.2 
39.5 1.9 60.3 
33.6 0.7 16.3 
32.1 0.7 16.3 
29.6 0.8 5.0 
28.7 2.4 19.5 
27.0 10.3' 40.0 
26.0 10.3 16.7 
20.4 2.6 46,2 
19.1 1.6 70.6 
18.6 1.3 62.9 
12.7 0.20 78.1 
12.4 0.01 -
1.1 3.4 5.0 
1.0 2.9 
-3.1 1.0 39.5 -4.6 7.2 12.2 
-5.2 3.6 21.2 
-10.0 5.3 13.4 
-10.3 15.0 •  29.6 
-10.5 14.1 22.3 
-10.7 0.4 57.4 
Su 000 
Source: Table 1* Department of Econcmics [1986]. 
11% 
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paid about 10 percent pver the border price for fertilizer (David 
and Balisacan [1982]). 
In the period leading up to the crisis, export agriculture 
became heavily monopsonized as the Marcos government introduced 
government mandated but privately controlled monopoly marketing 
operations in the coconut and the sugar industries. 
Interventions in these industries under the Marcos regime 
had been publicly justified by the need to improve the 
productivity in these old export industries. It was hoped that 
resources raised from monopoly profits and export taxes could be 
applied to productivity raising programs. The actual experience 
was that these resources were consolidated by persons close to 
the Marcos administration to be used for political purposes and 
for the purchase of existing monopoly enterprises in other 
economic areas. 
In the case of the coconut industry, for example, resources 
were raised-through a 'levy* collected from coconut farmers under 
the auspices of the government Philippine Coconut Authority and 
placed into a private fund. Because of the high substitutability 
against coconut oil in world markets, the incidence of the levy 
fell on the domestic farmers (see Clarete and Roumasset [1983J). 
In law, the fund was private and owned by the country's coconut 
farmers; in practice, only a small group controlled the funds 
» 
into Which a total of #9.7 billion (about $1.3 billion at the 
prevailing exchange rates) had been collected between August 1973 
and August 1982. 
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Of this amount, P2.6 billion was applied to gain monopoly 
control of domestic milling capacity which was then applied to 
lowering farmgate prices for copra, further reducing the incomes 
of coconut farmers. P2.1 billion was applied to various social 
amelioration projects for coconut farmers and only Pl.l billion 
went to the planting of hybrid seednuts. Part of the rest went 
for charity projects but the greater proportion was used to 
purchase a private commercial bank, which immediately grew to one 
of the nation's largest because the levy funds were deposited in 
the bank at no interest. In 1984, the resources of the bank were 
applied to the purchase of the country's largest private 
corporation.<3> 
The agricultural sector is also characterized by .backward 
production methods, low productivity, and a low rate of 
reinvestment. In rice, 1984 Philippine yields were 2.5 metric 
tons per hectare compared to tne Asian average of 3.3; sugar 
yields, 48.1 metric tons per hectare while the international 
average is 58.0. In 1979, twenty-five percent of palms were over 
60 years old and therefore 700,000 hectares were due for 
replanting.<4> 
In the short-run, agricultural - production is highly 
determined by the availability of credit to the sector. This is 
true for crops for local production and also for sugar. 
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Industry accounts for 34 percent of GDP. Industrial firms, 
heavily dependent on intermediate imports, typically enjoy 
oligopolistic positions in domestic markets. Such a structure naa 
been inherited from the golden years of import substitution. The 
oligopolistic structure has been reproduced through tax 
incentives, quantitative restrictions and exchange rate 
appreciation. 
Using estimates based on the 1974 input-output tables, the 
range of effective protection rates varies greatly from 49 to 200 
percent (Tan 1979). Using an index of 100 for the least 
protected sector, agriculture and primary products had an index 
of 100, manufacturing an index of 489, and all sectoris had an 
index of 400• Within the manufacturing sector, final consumption 
products had an index of 481 while construction had an index of 
100. If expoxtables have an index of 100, then non-exportables 
would have an index 1525. 
Bautista [1981] studied the correlation between the 
effective protection rate (EPR), percent of employment to total 
manufacturing, and within industry concentration, the flatter 
measured indirectly from the proportion of establishments in 
Metro Manila (Table 1.5). Meat processing, for example, has an 
EPR o"f 635.1 while employing only 2.2 percent of manufacturing 
employment. Fabricated metal products has a negative EPR of 10.3 
percent while employing 15 percent of manufacturing workers. 
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Notable export-oriented exceptions - are garments and 
semiconductor manufacturing. As noted earlier, the domestic 
value-added in these products are minimal. Moreover, garments 
have been subject to quotas in the U.S. market which has not only 
bred local oligopsonists in the industry but has also prevented a 
dynamic response to exchange rate incentives in this labor 
intensive sector. Export-oriented mining contributes about 1 
percent to GDP. 
Because of the long history of finished products prdtection, 
the greater part of industrial output cannot be classified as 
tradeables. Gonzalez [1984] estimates that in 1982, 71 percent of 
gross domestic product would be classified as. non-tradeables, 
12.3 percent would be exportables and 16.7 percent as importables 
(Table 1.6). 
For example, five companies were producing cars under a 
progressive car manufacturing program. In studies conducted at 
the Tariff Commission, however, it has been seen that, especially 
for Japanese cars, these companies were using imported components 
so that in the computation of the total costs, these cars cost 
more than the imported finished cars themselves because shipping 
the knocked down parts costs more and also, possibly, because of 
some overpricing for kickbacks. 
The services sector contributes almost 40 percent of GDP and 
is dominated by low productivity jobs in trade in transportation. 
A significant proportion of the workforce, about 800,000 workers 
at the peak from a labor force of .21 million, are employed 
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Table 1.6 
PERCENT .DISTRIBUTION OP REAL AND NOMINAL 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY SECTOR, 1967-1982 
Non-tradables _ Exportables Importables 
Year Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal 
1967 70.3 72.2 15.4 15,6 14.3 12.2 
1970 70.0 68.0 15.4 17.1 14.6 14.9 
1973 67.7 65.8 15.1 16,8 17,2 17.4 
1976 69.7 67.3 14.3 13.4 16.0 19.3 
1979 70.1 66.5 13.7 14.7 16.2 is;9 
1982 71.0 71.4 12.3 11.1 16.7 17.5 
Source: Gonzales (1984). Table 3. 
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abroad. The officially recorded remittances of these workers have 
been sensitive to the black market premium of the foreign 
t 
exchange rate. 
Foreign trade is a significant proportion of output. Imports 
account for about 25 percent and exports for 20 percent of GNP. 
Merchandise imports averaged'about $7.5 billion a year in 
the period leading up to the crisis while exports could manage 
about $5.5 billion in a good year. Since the second oil crisis, 
the order of magnitude of the annual trade deficit exhibited a 
rising trend from about $1.5 to about $2.0 billion. 
Consumer goods constitute about 7 percent of imports* The 
most critical import items are raw materials and intermediate 
good imports which constitute about 40 percent of the total and 
capital goods imports which•constitute about 23 percent. As the 
experience in the crisis has brought out intensely, the evolution 
of imports is dominated by 'noncompetitive intermediates and, as 
such, enter into prime cost' (Taylor [1981]). 
Raw material and agricultural exports .(coconut products, 
logs and lumber, copper concentrates) contribute about 46 percent 
of total exports and the.country has relied on these exports 
since the colonial period. Non-traditional exports (garments, 
semiconductors, furniture, shrimps) have been growing in 
importance but are plagued by high import content, unreliable 
supply of domestic inputs (for example, furniture exporters have 
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a difficult time obtaining wood locally)/ and high dependence on 
working capital financing.<5> 
On the demand side, consumption constitutes 63 percent of 
GNP. Government expenditures represent about 12 percent of 
output. 
The investment ratio averaged 29.3 percent between 1974 and 
1983 with the government taking an increasing role. Investment in 
the *1970s had been fueled by the inflow of government guaranteed 
foreign debt as can be seen indirectly in Table 1.7. 
In the year 1979, the government began a big push into 
corporate investments as in its much heralded 'countercyclical 
policy' so that the increase in government savings was matched by 
an increase in 'corporate' savings. The extension of government 
guarantees through its large financial enterprises, the 
Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the 
Philippines, spurred corporate investment, especially in new 
•conglomerates' owned by individuals close to the Marcoses. 
1.3.2 Prices and Cost Formation 
For agricultural exports, the Philippines is almost wholly a 
price taker. The swings in terms of trade shown in Table 1.3 
mimic the recessions and booms in the OECF countries because of 
the importance of agricultural exports in the country's trad^. 
Increases in the peso prices of coconut oil have exerted pressure 
an domestic prices of cooking oil in the past but these pressures 
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Table 1.7 
investment, Savings, and the Investment-Savings Gap 
(in percent of 6NP1) 
_Net_Savings_to_6NPJatio_ Capital Investment 
Consumption Gross Gross Savings 
Year Households Corporations Gov't Allowance Savings Investment Gap 
1974 8.2 2.5 4.6 8.6 23.8 25.1 1.3 1975 8.5 2.8 3.1 9.9 24.3 29.6 5.3 1974 10.9 3.1 1.8 9.6 25.4 31.3 5.9 1977 10.6 2.4 J.O 9.5 25.6 29.0 3.3 1978 8.4 2,9 3.9 9.5 24.7 29.0 4.3 19791 6.5 5.7 5.1 9.4 26.8 31.0 4.3 1980 6.0 5.5 5.0 9.3 25.7 30.7 5.0 1981 6.5 5.3 3.8 10.1 25.7 30.7 5.1 1982 3.4 4.4 3.0 10.3 21.2 28.8 7.6 1983 2.2 4.3 3.7 10.3 20.6 27.5 7.0 
\m -0.8 16 3.8 10.2 15.9 18.6 2.8 
(Totals aay not add up due to rounding errors 
•Start of 'countercyclical policy" 
Source: National :Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) 
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were not so strong in the adjustment period because of the 
generally depressed demand for coconut products. 
With respect to key agricultural products for dqmestic 
consumption, notably rice which is the staple, the country had a 
price control program before the crisis. The price control 
program consisted of mandated price ceilings for these products 
and did not involve subsidies from the government budget. The 
government rice buying program was principally directed at 
stabilizing prices, even though it gradually began to control an 
increasing proportion of the domestic trade from an initial 
participation of about 10 percent of the market. 
Because of the import content of fertilizer prices, however, 
it was necessary to adjust rice and corn pricesj_-in response to 
the devaluations and this was another channel of inflation. 
Between June 1983 and December 1984, the support price for 
unmilled rice had to be increased by 97.1 percent and this 
induced a 72.6 percent increase in the price of milled rice.<6> 
Starting in the last quarter of 1984, however, the 
government seized the opportunity by starting to remove price 
controls o,n basic commodities (also in response to IMF pressure). 
In September 1985, in anticipation of the rice - harvest, price 
controls on rice, the last item to be decontrolled, were removed. 
Prices in the industrial sector, are determined principally 
as the adding up of Costs: importation -costs plus tariffs plus 
production costs plus markup (though it is difficult to point to 
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some study providing direct evidence). Declines in demand during 
the adjustment did not reduce the real prices of these products, 
though it did induce the closure of many of the enterprises 
producing them including the domestic car firms. 
Minimum wages are set by 'tripartite bargaining' but are 
unenforceable in the great majority of firms (Tidalgo and 
Esguerra [1984]). Unions, even while successful in obtaining 
increases in the legislated minimum wage, had been too weak under 
the martial law regime to demand local enforcement. 
Mariano's [1985] monthly inflation model provides some 
"clues' about the relative strengths of these influences on 
domestic inflation (see Table 1.8). This one-equation model is a 
forecasting equation, and not a structural one. 
In the long-run, the strongest influence on inflation in the 
Philippines is some function of the relationship of total 
monetary liquidity to real output-. In the short-run, however, it. 
is the lQ£al currency prices of imports, fuel and non-fuel, that 
have the biggest impact on inflation, followed by 'the' interest 
rate. Wages, export prices, liquidity, food prices, and the black 
market premium ('a proxy for the inflationary effects of 
developments in the political scene and the scarcity of foreign 
exchange', Mariano [1985, p. 8]) have smaller impact in the short 
run. 
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Table 1.8 
The Inflationary Process*! 
5hort'-Rim<2>' Lonq-Run<J> 
Variable Elasticity Elasticity Coefficient T-statistic<4> 
Peso price 
of oil ,0.176 0.553 0.634 3.20 
Foreign exchange 
black aarket 0.017 0.055 0.042 0.B4 
preaiua 
Peso inport price 
for non-fuels 192 0.603 7.232 4.20 
Total liquidity<5> 
over real 6NP 0.060 0.750 5.413 5,81 
Interest on 91-day 
treasury bills 0.138 0.434 . 0.925 5.82 
Peso export price 
index ' 0.075 0.237 0.029 3.04 
Legislated ainiaua 
oage 0.144 0.454 0.609 3.06 
Price ceilings on 
food index 0.020 0.062 0.984 2.04 
CPI lagged one 
•onth 0.975 16.65 
CP I lagged two 
aonths -0.293 -5.29 
Duuy for 1965 18.B86 6.40 
<1> Based on the flonthly Single Equation Inflation' Hodel of Hariano [1985. 
of the consuaer price index. The equation is estimated 
fro* January 1972 to Harch 1985 with a duaay variable for 1985. 
<2> This is the elasticity of the annual inflation rate which is computed 
for any explanatory variable X as <dCPI/(CPI-CPK-12»)/(dm> 
<3> The long run rate is that for which CPr= CPl(-l) = CPU-2) 
<4> On the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero 
<5> The actual variable is the sua, over the last foar »onths, of the 
ratio of total liquidity each aontti to seaestfal BNP 
Source: tlariano C19853, Tables 2 and 10. 
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2.'0 Actual Adjustment Strategy 
2.1 Toward the 1983 Crisis 
In 1979, after the second oil shock it was the stated policy of 
the government to engage in 'countercyclical policy' which 
practical terms meant-pushing up the investment rate through an 
increased rate of foreign borrowing under government guarantee. 
The huge increases in the budget deficit was financed primarily 
through the incurring of foreign, mostly short-term debt, as 
international credit became increasingly scarce. 
Concurrent with the shlft__to short-term borrowing, there was 
a more pronounced dependence on commercial bank, variable 
interest, accomodation after 1980. 
As early as 1981, large investment projects to favored 
# 
groups of the Marcos regime started to fail (de Dios [1984], 
Montes [1986]). 
The large budget deficits that began to appear in 1980 can 
be traced in. most part to increasing budgetary contributions from 
the national government to government financial institutions 
which had started to fail because on one hand many of the private 
sector projects that these financial institutions had lent to had 
started to fail and on the other hand they were maintaining the 
servicing of their own foreign liabilities up to date. 
These contributions to government corporations to enable 
them to maintain the service on their foreign obligations 
generated tremendous pressure on the government budget.- Table 2*1 
shows how much smaller the government budget deficit might have 
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been had these budgetary contributions not been . made to 
government corporations. In the years immediately preceding the 
crisis, 1981 through 1983, there would have been government 
surpluses of about 1,5 percent of GNP if these contributions 
could have been avoided (Table 2.1). 
These goyerjua&at- Jaudget deficits in turn translated into 
current account deficits as shown in Table 2.2. In the period 
from 1975 to 1982, the government budget deficit peaked at 4.7 
percent of GNP and the current account deficit at 7.6 percent of 
GNP (Table 2.2). In the same period, the total external debt 
doubled to $26 billion between 1979 and 1983. 
2.2 The Adjustment Strategy 
When the 1983 balance of payments crisis struck the Philippines 
was operating within an IMP standby program. In this program a 
target of $800 million for the balance of payments deficit for 
the year 1983 had been set. By June of 1983, the balance of 
payments deficit had reached $562 million and it was clear that 
the country would not fulfill its IMF commitments by yearend. 
The peso was devalued in June 1983 from P9 to the dollar to 
Pll but this did not change the increasing difficulty the country 
was experiencing in rolling over its existing short-term credits 
with the commercial banks. The Aquino assassination on 21 August 
1983 triggered a torrent of closures of commercial credit lines 
to the country. At that time, it seemed to the Marcos government 
that the principal problem was the restoration of trade credits. 
To do this, the government turned to the IMF and began to 
renegotiate its adjustment program, 
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Table? 2. 1 
Effect on the Budget Deficit 
o-f "Contributions to Government Corporations 
Hypathet i c a 1 
Total Buctget Eurp 1 us (Def iciti 
Contri buti on wi thout Contr i bution 
Budget to Government 
Deficit Corporations Level .As X. of GIMP 
Year (P_mi 11 i on) (P_.mil lion) (P mi 1 1 i on ) .(Percent) 
1975 1,403 807 (596) (0. 5 ) 
1976 2,349 2,196 (153.) i 0. 1) 
1977 2,852 2,498 (354) •( 0. 2) 
1978 2,167 2,877 710 0.4 
1979 342 3,869 3, 527 1 . 6 
1980 3,387 .5,244 1, 857 O. 7 
1981 12,146 8,426 (3,720) (1,4) 
1982 14,405 9,308 (5,097) ( I . 7 ) 
1983 6,422 5,407 (1 , 015) (0. 3) 
1984 8,714 10,248 1 , 534 0.-4 
Total 54,187 50,880 3,307 (0„ 1 ) 
Source of Data: Amatong and Others, t 1985 3, Tabl«S 4.4 and 4.5 
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Table 2.2 
Budget and Current. Account D e f i c i t s 
<in million pe.sas and percent) 
Year 
Budget 
Surplus" 
<P„mi11 ion) 
euoget- Deficit 
to GNP Ratio 
Deficit to GNP 
(percent) 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
(P„mi11 ion) 
C u r r e n t . A c c o u n t 
t o GNP R a t i o 
< percent) 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
-1,403 
-2,349 
-2,852 
~2,167 
-342 
-3,387 
-12,146 
-14,405 
-1. 2 
-1.8 
-1.8 
-1.2 
-0.2 
-1.3 
-4.6 
-4. 7 
-6,071 
-7,920 
-4,872 
-8 ,'385 
-9,763 
~ 13, 536 
-15,338 
-25,339 
tr s,!. 
-5. 9 
-4. 7 
-4. 5 
-•5. 1 . 
-5. 1 
-7.6 
1983 -6,422 -1.9 -26,394 7.0 
1?84 -8,714 -14,756 -2. 7. 
Source?: Amatong (1985), 
NEDA Statistical pp. 17-18. Yearbook, 1985 
On 11- October 1983 the government devalued the peso from PI 1 
to pl4 to the dollar and announced: (l)'that it was declaring a 
moratorium on the payment of principal on its debt and (2) that 
it was negotiating a new program with the IMF. These negotiations 
were not completed until a new program was agreed upon in 
December 1984. 
There were many factors behind the long delay in reaching an 
agreement with the IMF. After negotiations commenced around 
October 1983, there seemed to have been an excellent chance to 
reach an agreement by December 1983. The leaking to the public 
regarding the Central Bank's overstatement of its international 
reserves - it turned out since 1981 - by as much as $800 million 
led to a breakdown in talks with the IMF in .December 1983 . 
Unconfirmable rumors attribute the leaking of.,, the 
information to the international commercial banks which had 
started balking at increasing their Philippine exposure. This 
would have been quite comprehensible to a disinterested observer 
since it had been the commercial banks whose exposure had been 
rapidly increasing since 1980. In fact, their recent generosity 
with short-term, variable interest syndicated loans for the 
Central Bank had been an important factor behind the capability 
of the Marcos government to avoid seriously wrestling with the 
adjustment problem. 
In the meantime, there was a sharp runup in money supply 
starting in December 1983 from many different contributory 
factors. The devaluation of October forced the Central Bank to 
honor the forward exchange cover commitments it had entered into 
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in the previous period as a strategy to increase foreign 
financing inflows. The sharp increase in money supply in the last 
quarter was also caused by the the contribution the Central Bank 
made to the Development Bank of the Philippines so that it could 
service the guarantees it had extended to foreign creditors. 
By January 1984, the campaign for the national assembly for 
the. May elections had begun in earnest. The Marcos regime saw 
this exercise a:s its first opportunity to prove to the world that 
it was in firm control. It took until July 1984 when the regime 
saw fit to directly address the balance of payments problem 
again. 
In order to ration the foreign exchange through this period, 
the Central Bank imposed exchange controls, imposing a limit of 
$50000 per month per client. Until December 1984, the government 
(and the country) operated with almost no foreign financing for 
its international trade and the Marcos government resorted to 
various stopgap measures. 
Until trade credits could be restored and except for oil and 
a few essential commodities, the cutoff in international trade 
credit meant importations were allowed on a no dollar basis'. 
Under this system, no documentation was required regarding the 
source of the foreign exchange used to import goods. This in 
effect meant that private businessmen could import as long as 
they used their own foreign exchange funds. 
The government also obtained emergency USAID financing *£o 
import fertilizer for the planting season. The government managed 
to obtain a total $2.2 billion from official sources in 1984 and 
1985. In 1984, it received $1 billion composed of more than $300 
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million from the World Bank and the Asiarj Development Bank, $425 
million in credits from the U.S. Eximbank and the Commodity 
Credit Corporation and almost $200 million from Japan. 
As an indication of the government's desperation, for one 
year until December 1984, the government allowed firms with 
foreign participation to apply the cost of their importations 
toward equity in those firms. 
One might say that at this point the IMF changed its posture 
from that of a doting parent to that of a vengeful god. It seemed 
as if the IMF had made the judgement that the authoritarian 
government had finally put itself in such a helpless position 
that it would have to accede to giving government technocrats who 
had attempted vainly in the past to carry out its suggested 
reforms a decisive influence over public management.<12> 
The train of events that were set in place by this change in 
approach diverged significantly from IMF expectations. The 
authoritarian government was powerful enough to do two normally 
contradictory things at the same time; to protect the interests 
<5.f. its .supporters and to_ carry ,. out a n a d just me n t program, even 
within an IMF program, at the same time. / 
This strategy by the authoritarian government, however, led 
to its increasing isolation especially in the urban areas and in 
the business sector and led to a result that neither the IMF nor 
the United States government expected: the overthrow in February 
1986 of the regime they had been working with for a long time. It 
is probably accurate to say that neither the IMF nor the U.S. 
government would have been anxious to claim credit for this 
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result at the moment that it happened. 
The Marcos government's analysis cif the crisis focused 
primarily on the loss of trade financing. The government's 
negotiating strategy was premised on such an analysis. Under this 
framework, the return of commercial credit was the ultimate 
objective and in the situation it was necessary to obtain the 
necessary IMF blessing. The government sought and eventually 
obtained: (1) an IMF standby agreement of SDR 615 million and (2) 
a rescheduling with the Paris Club Of $0.8 billion in official 
payments. 
These agreements formed the basis for the new accomodation 
from the private commercial banks with three key elements: (1) a 
rescheduling of principal payments due within the two year period 
ending 31 December 1986, (2) $925 million new money, and (3) the 
establishment of a $3 billion trade facility.. The level of the 
trade facility approximated their trade financing exposure to the 
country in October 1983. Both the IMF and the commercial bank new 
money were designed to augment the Central Bank's international 
reserves. 
It is important to point out that because the analysis 
focused primarily on the need to restart trade financing, the 
Marcos government's, .aosucflack•.inherently short jfcerm. This 
Short-term and commercial orientation was strongly confirmed when 
J. Laya, a former academic who had been the governor of Central 
Bank since 1981, was replaced in January 1984 by J. Fernandez, a 
principal owner of one of the country's largest commercial banks, 
as a result of the international reserve overstatement scandal. 
It is also important to note that because the chosen 
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negotiating strategy made IMF support indispensable, the Marcos 
government felt that it had to attain all the agreed-upon targets 
to the letter, irregardless of its impact on the economy. In this 
period, powerful individuals in the Marcos government seemed to 
be acting in the belief that this time the government had at 
least to humor the IMF. 
The country's 'adjustment' program was prosecuted first in 
the year 1984 while the country was negotiating with the IMF and 
then in 1985 under the new, the 18th, standby agreement. 
That the government was operating under the aegis of the IMF 
even before the actual program began in January 1985 was widely 
known. The dimensions of the implicit adjustment program in 1984 
can be deduced from a table entitled 'A Framework for Adjustment" 
that the Central Bank produced in November 1984.<7> The numbers 
from this table and the subsequent actual figures are given in 
Table 2.3. 
Under the December 1984 agreement, the Philippine government 
had undertaken the following prior action measures: (1) 'the 
reduction in reserve money,' (2) 'the float of the exchange 
rate,' (3) abolition of the foreign exchange 'surrender 
requirement and the priority allocation system introduced after 
17 Octooer 1983 and the reform of the foreign exchange system,' 
(4) 'increase in interest rates on Central Bank bills and 
Treasury bills to approximately 40 percent at the time of the 
float, together with increases in several other lending and 
deposit rates,' (5) 'implementation of a significant tax package 
involving structural changes to broaden and strengthen the tax 
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Noveaber 
.able 2.3 
1994 Fr alienor k for Adjustaent 
versus Actual 
1984 19B5 1986 
1983 Proj. Actual Proj. Actual Proi. Actual 
External' objectives 
Current account deficit (US* bn.) 
(Percent of GNPI 
Exports (percent change in 
US* value) 
Imports (percent change in 
US* value) 
Trails balance (l!S$ bn.) 
Met international reserves<l> 
(change in U.S. dollars) 
firrairs (USt bn., end-period) 
2.8 
8.1 
-0.3 
2^.3 
-2.5 
-0.5 
1.6 
1.5 
5.2 
5.9 
-23.0 
-0.5 
-0.4 
1.9 
1.3 
3.9 
7.7 
-18.9 
-0.7 
0.5 
2 i 7 
1.1 
4.1 
10.0 
-1.6 
0.1 
2.5 
-14.1 
-15.8 
-0.5 
2.8 
0.6 
2.3 
11.0 
3.4 
0.5 
• a a 
-0.9 
-3.1 
1.6 
-7.5 
HU 
Un percent ot unrj 
Savings and investuent 
6ross doaestic investaent 27.1 22.0 If. 2 22.5 16.2 23.0 14.0 
Total savings 
Gross national savings 
Foreign savings 
27.1 
19.0 
8.1 
22.0 
16.8 
5.2 
19.2 
15.3 
3.9 
22.5 
18.4 
4.1 
16.2 
16.2 
23.0 
20.7 
2.3 
14.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
(Percentage increase) 
Honey (end-period) 
M3 
Reserve aoney 
19 
49 
10 
15 
7 
. 12 
13 
n 
10 
B 
12 
10 
5i0<2> 
21.0?2> 
6NP and prices 
Real 6NP 
Consuner price index (end-period) 
Cansuaer price index (average) 
1.1 
26.1 
10.0 
-6 
40-45 
45-50 
-4.8 
50.8 
50.3 
10-15 
20-25 
-3:8 
5.7 
23.1 
6-10 
10 
0.1 
-0.3 
0.B 
Public coapensation per employee 9.5 18 20.3 22 34.4 * * • n.a. 
<lMnclusive of external arrears 
<2Hip to September only. 
Source: Central Bank, Econoaic Heaorandua, Noveaber 
Quarterly Econoeic and Financial Report 
1984, ' fable 4, p . 17 ind 
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base,' and (6) 'increases in administered prices to reflect 
market conditions,' and (7) 'formulation of the domestic 
counterpart peso deposit scheme covering foreign currency 
obligations designed to support the attainment of monetary 
aggregates'.<8> 
Except for item number 7, these prior action measures can 
only be interpreted as classic IMF adjustment measures. Item 
numDer / was a scheme by wnich the Philippine debtors, 
particularly the government corporations such as the National 
Power Corporation, would pay for their debt service to the 
Central Bank in pesos. The Central Bank would in turn assume the 
dollar liability. The reason why the scheme could be said to be 
'designed to support the attainment of monetary aggregates' is 
precisely because the financial payments being ultimately raised 
either from tax revenue (which are transformed into the national 
government contributions to these companies) or from the 
"increases in administered prices' ended up being sterilized with 
the Central Bank. 
The latter scheme has been a significant factor in 
drastically increasing the effective marginal propensity to save 
by the government sector which has a contractionary short-term 
effect (Krugman and Taylor [1978]). 
An examination of Table 2.3 shows that the government more 
than fulfilled the program targets"deemed most critical by the 
IMF. The actual current account deficit of 1984 was $1.3 billion 
(3.9 percent of GNP) compared to the target $1.5 billion (5.2 
percent of GNP). In'1985, the first year of the official IMF 
program, instead of the planned current deficit of $1.1 billion 
16a 
(4.1 percent of GNP), there was actually a slight current account 
surplus 8 million dollars (about zero percent of GNP). In 1986, 
mostly under a new government but with the level of activity 
already depressed, instead of a current account deficit of $0.6 
billion, there was another surplus of $0.9 billion. 
For 1984 and 1985,, all the monetary growth targets are more 
than fulfilled (Table 2.3). Only in 1986, with the change in 
government, were these monetary ceilings exceeded. 
There was also an overachievement with respect to the 
inflation targets in 1985, the first year of the official IMP 
program, 5.7 percent actual by yearend compared to lfr-15 percent 
in the program (Table 2.3). In 1985, the forseen inflow of 
foreign savings worth 4.1 percent of GNP did not materialize even 
under the IMF program. 
Within this framework, the government carried out a 
mcaetar^gt^ad^uatlRent program which provided for requirements ,of 
the regime and its followers at the same time that it drastically 
reduced the current account deficit through the reduction of 
credit to the private sector. 
The nature of this approach is documented in Table 2.4 which 
provides details in the annual rates pf changes in reserve money 
for each quarter from 1980 to 1985. We can now explain the Marcos 
cum IMF approach using the data in this table. 
The first requirement of the regime was the maintenance cjf 
its grip on_ pojLl'tical and niill-tarY powpr.- Given the key role that 
the United States had always played in national politics through 
its moral authority over th& armed forces, political control was 
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secured, in the first instance, through election exercises. Since 
the onset of the crisis, there were two elections of crucial 
importance to the authoritarian government: one in May 1984 for 
members of the parliament and the snap election for president in 
February 1986.<9> 
An examination of the credits to the public sector by the 
Central Bank for the quarters 1983.4, 1984.1, 1984.2 
corresponding to the period before the first election reveals 
significant increases in lending to the government at the same 
time that credits to the deposit banks were being decreased. The 
same thing can be said for the quarters 1984.3 and 1984.4 before 
the February 1986 election.<10> 
The Marcos regime provided for the requirements of its 
immediate followers by many different means. The most important 
mearts was through Central Bank and national government 
contributions to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), 
and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) that prevented these 
companies from going under while failing to collect on its 
receivables from favored groups and individuals. As of end-1985, 
58.2 percent of PNB and 87.0 percent of DBP assets were 
classified as 'non-performing'. The values of these assets 
totalled P41.4 billion (about $2.2 billion) for PNB and P65.2 
billion (about $3.4 billion) for DBP. 
The exchange controls that had been reinforced upon the 
onset of the crisis favored group's and individuals close to the 
government. As the banking crisis worsened, the speed of the 
bailouts became dependent on neutrality with respect to, if not 
closeness to the regime. In one case, fund releases from World 
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Bank credits to a private development bank had been held up 
unnecessarily reportedly because its president was active in the 
opposition.<11> The election exercise of May 1984 provided a 
means by which government resources could be transferred to 
supporters of the regime at the local levels. 
At the overall level, however, the IMF targets could only be 
attained by redirecting resources away from the private sector as 
a whole toward the government and the private sector allied to 
Marcos. Thus the general strategy required that while resources 
were increasing for the defense of the authoritarian government, 
overall financial resources were being kept constant in nominal 
terms and actually being reduced in real terms, because of the 
concomittant inflation, in order to meet the IMF targets. 
The private sector, in general, did have a claim to some 
insurance of its resources at the start of the crisis from the 
forward cover that had been provided by the government earlier. 
In Table 2.4, the item that changes the most drastically from 
1983 onward is 'other* claims. During the crisis, this item was 
dominated by revaluation effects and increases in claims on the 
Central Bank based on forward exchange cover previously provided. 
These increases were induced by the devaluations in June and 
October 1983. 
TO have honored all of these claims, as the Central Bank had 
started to do in the last quarter of 1983, would have viofated 
the implicit IMF ceilings for 1984. 
The initial intervention of the Central.Bank was to 'block' 
the peso credits created by these liabilities which turned-up as 
27 
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Table 2.4 
Control o-f Monetary Base 
(Annual rates -o-f change, percent) 
Net Net Net ...CI ai ms_on_ 
Reserve FDr.ei.gn Domestic Pub lie Deposi t 
Quarter Money Assets Assets Sector Banks Other 
1980.1 15.7 - 3 . 6 - 2 2 . 2 36. 1 ~ 128.3 
. 2 12.4 —3. 2 30. 3 - 1 0 . 9 42. 9 - 6 2 . 6 
.3 9.9 -4.0 19 .2 - a . 2 128.7 —305.9 
. 4 10.7 -38. 0 4 1 . 3 53. 6 64. 0 ... o '"> "7 m 
1981.1 4 -108.3 64.7 125. 7 57. 1 -428.7 
. 2 16. 6 -111.3 125.0 536. 6 71. 1 - 1 17 . '9 
.3 15.5 -171.3 116.0 460.1 64. 1 23„ 0 
.4- 9.9 -214.8 72.0 96.2 30.9 343. 3 
1982.1 16.3 -1743.0 71.5 130. 6 34.. 2 -319/3 
.2 6.0 1205-3 57. 1 75.9 13.8 128. 0 
.3 4.0 -245.4 46.9 104 . 6 4.4 288. 4 
.4 4.8 -349.2 68. 3 49.4 1.7 590.2 
J$83.1 8.0 -138.5 .53.2 15. 4 5.6 832. 3 
.2 2.5 -220.7 79.8 1.3 -17.4 3481.1 
.3 16. 1 -195.5 89. 9 -1.9 -38. 8 2386.0 
.4 48.7 -92.5 70.3 33. 4 -38. 1 207. 6 
1?B4.1 45.4 -77. 1 62.0 48. 3 -87.5 259. 5 
.2 68.6 -78/6 74. 9 56.5 -47.2 145. 1 
.3 62.5 -61.0 62 . 4 6.2 14.2 94.7 
• 4 20.6 -48.4 36. 1 -37. 7 -42.6 76.5 
1785.1 22.9 -56.7 42.7 -11.2 137.9 69. 2 
. 2 16.7 5.3 2.5 -27.9 -50. 9 18.1 
• 3 13.8 -Z8.2 23.2 20 .'8 -53.2 35. 2 
,4 13.6 -63.7 44.0 109.4 24.3 37.6 
Spurcej Central Bank o-f the Phi 1ippines 
'blocked credits' with the Central Bank. In this way, while the 
balance sheets of the affected financial enterprises were not 
impaired,, the financial system was also rendered incapable of 
utilizing these resources. A 'blocked credit' was a balance with 
(an obligation of) the Central Bank. 
The other intervention of the Central Bank turned to be the 
more powerful and destructive. This was the sale of Central Bank 
bills at interest rates that peaked at 43 percent in October 
1984. In the nature of these bills, locally known as 'Jobo 
Bills '<13>/ their rate became the interest on 'fully secured' 
loans. These bills had maturities as short as thirty days? the 
longest maturity sold was for 270 days. 
In conjunction with this strategy which was tantamount to 
the Central Bank directly borrowing from the financial system, 
the so-called reverse repurchase agreements also.became a key 
financial instrument. The 'reverse repurchase agreement' was 
applied to maturing Central Bank obligations. On t|»e maturity of 
such obligations the Central Bank would have had to repurchase 
the obligation. The reversal of this repurchase was tantamount to 
rolling over the obligation at a new interest rate. 
The strategy turned into a full scale attack on the 
financial system <as the private banks were beseiged by 
preterminations of time deposits by depositors seeking to 
transfer their assets into Central Bank instruments. Small thrift 
banks and the largest savings bank in the country failed, A World 
Bank estimate has the total real deposits falling by 29.2 
percent and total real loans outstanding falling by 53.8 percent 
for the commercial banking system in two years between 1983 and 
16a 
1985. in the two y< s between 1982- and 1984, M2 as a fraction of 
GNb declined from 23.5 percent to 20.4. 
Man)if,a.c.tnri ng„ operations shut down or scaJjad,„dom as. tije 
• J&fifrricin? working capital became prohibitive, 
c o m p a r e d t o the return available on a fully secured Central Bank 
bill or a Treasury bill. Capacity utilization, ratios of 40 
percent in many of the mainline industries, such as appliance 
manufacturing, became typical well into the year 1986. Commercial 
bank loans with maturities lasting over a year disappeared. The 
yearend nominal value of loans outstanding of the commercial 
banking system to the manufacturing sector fell by 9.2 percent in 
1984 and by 31.9 percent in 1985. The decline in real value terms 
of these variables would be much more in view of the 50 percent 
1984 inflation rate. 
Even the agriculture, sector was not spared from the 
"withdrawal of credit. The outstanding loans of commercial banks 
to agriculture in nominal terms fell by 35.9 percent iri 1984 and 
by 0.3 percent in 1985. 
As net external financing to the national government fell 
and the Central Bank was compelled to reduce the growth rate of 
reserve money under the IMF program, the government had to 
increase its borrowing from the private sector even while its 
deficit was falling from 4.3 percent of GNP in 1982 to 1.8 
percent in 1984. Between December 1983 and December 1985, the 
growth rate of the stock of government securities held by the 
private sector exceeded 50 percent per year. 
While the national government was appearing to successfully 
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approximate the public sector borrowing requirement targets that 
had been set in the adjustment program, the Central Bank was 
effectively taking up the deficit burden through its sales of CB 
bills at very high interest rates. Table 2.5 provides a summary 
of the whole deficit, in percent to GNP that might be attributed 
to the whole government sector for the years 1983-1985. 
The overall government deficit actually increased in 1984 
from.8.2 percent of GNP to 8.3 percent (Table 2.5). This occurred 
inspite of the slight drop in the national government deficit 
and the large drop in the deficit of the large government 
corporations. It was the Central Bank whose deficit actually 
exceeded the public sector borrowing requirement, which took up 
the slack. Its deficit of 5.2 percent of GNP in 1984 was mostly 
traced to losses incurred from the interest payments on the CB 
Bills that it had floated in that year to reduce monetary base 
and liquidity. 
In 1985, the public sector borrowing requirement was 
actually just as large as the Central Bank deficit (Table 2.5). 
In 1985, it was the deficits of the government financial 
institutions that almost doubled from 1.6 percent to 3.1 percent 
of GNP. These deficits could only have meant that private sector 
resources were being withdrawn to service the requirements of the 
government and its need to meet IMF program .targets. The year 
1985 was a particularly difficult year since in that year no net 
foreign savings was received. 
The immediate errect or the strategy was the steep rise in 
nominal domestic interest rates (Table 2.6) accompanying the huge 
shift ot financial resources from the private sector to the 
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Table 2.5 
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT SECTOR DEFICIT 
(as Percent of GNP) 
1983 1984 1985 
National government deficit' -1.95 -1.86 -1.88 
Monitored—^ corporations deficit -3.53 -2.20 -1.36 
National government transfers 
"to monitored corporations 1.32 1.08 0.61 
Public sector borrowing requirement -4.16 -2.98 -2.64 
Deficit of government financial 
institutions (GFI) -1.40 -1.62 -3.11 
Net income of Central Bank -3.64 -5.24 -2.61 
Others^ 0.16 -0.04 0.15 
National government transfers to GFIs and other corporations 0.82 1.58 2.10 Consolidated public sector deficit -8.22 -8.30 -6.11 
1/ 
— "Monitored" under the IMF adjustment program. 
2/ 
— Including other nonfinancial government institutions, 
local government, and the social security system. 
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Table 2.6 
Interest r.ates, l n at ion, arid Wage Rates 
(Annual Growth Rates) 
91-d ay 90-day CF l Real Noti :i. 11 a i 
Quarter T-b j. 11 MLA REF list 1 o Wage I'J. 
_ 
rate t.!. on 
1983. 1 14.044 14.717 6. 6 „ 5 0 - 000 
1 983. 13.861 14.589 7, ..... -7.3 0. 000 
1983. 3 14.021 15.129 9. 0 .. 08 1 
1983. 4 14.902 16.266 26. 1 -••26. 0 0. 133 
1934. 1 16.392 17.434 39. -•39. 2 0. 079 
1984. 18.260 19.016 49, 2 --49. 1 0. 09 i 
1984. 3 35.301 24.643 63. 6 —63. 5 0. 13,1. 
1984. 4 42.189 36.005 50. 8 -50. 7 0. 065 
1985. i 32„048 26.653 39 3 -39. a 0«031 1 
1985. <ii- 34.. 074 24.759 27. 7 -27.7 0« 000 
1985. 25.643 19.831 12. 7 • - .1.2 „ 7 0.000 
1 m 4 16.898 13.857 5. 7. -5. 7 0.000 
1936. 1 23.894 15.625 .... .... 0. 000 
1986. 2 16.255 14.562 1. 1 -1. 1 0. 000 
1986. . \ 13.974 11.000 4 J. „ 4 0, 000 
1986. 4 - .... .... 
government and the Central Bank. 
< 
The monetarist strategy worked as powerfully as its 
supporters claim it could work. The speculation against the 
currency was brought to a full stop. 
The tightness of credit induced a contraction in the economy 
that 'solved' the external financing problem. The most telling 
evidence that the domestic macroeconomic management was more 
restrictive than might have been necessary is the fact that by 
yearend 1985, $1.74 billion of the $3.0 billion trade credit that 
had been arranged under the IMF program remained unused. 
The effect of the monetarist program was certainly an 
adjustment, especially in the current account. The path to the 
adjustment, however, involved (1) a shooting up of inflation from 
8 percent before the crisis to a peak of 63 percent before it was 
controlled and, notwithstanding the induced inflation, (2) a fall 
in real output of 6.8 percent in 1984 and 3.8 percent in 1985. 
The first effect, inflation, drastically reduced income 
levels for almost all the population (except for those; who had 
the liquidity to move into Central Bank and Treasury bills). This 
precipitous fall in real income plus the disappearance of credit 
even for exports induced the fall in income and output. 
The rapid fall in income levels, in turn, wiped out domestic 
demand which later solved, the inflation problem itself. 
Table 2.7 attempts to depict the drastic fall in economic 
activity and income in the tight credit regime of 1984. In this 
table only data, used by the planning office for monitoring 
purposes, from 200 largest corporations are shown so that it 
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Table 2.7 
Annualized Monthly Growth Rates o-f 
Value of Production, Employment, 
Consumer & Wholesale Prices 
Prodn Compen- Employ- CPI WPI F'rodn 
Value s&tion ment Value 
-WPI 
1933 17.2 8.4 -2.8 10.9 18.0 -0.8 
1 4. 1 8.4 i J * tj 4.7 10. 5 -6.4 2 13. 6 3.5 -6.0 6.5 11.6 2.0 
y 16.9 3.0 -8. 1 6.3 9.7 7.2 
4 12.5 5.8 —Jmy "r 6.2 9.7 2.8 
5 15.4. 6.6 -1.4 6.0 9.5 5.9 
6 19.0 6.0 -1.4 7.5 10*9 8. 1 
7 12.8 5.4 -0.9 8.4 14.3 -1.5 
8 18.3 10. 9 -1.5 8.7 14.2 4. 1 
9 25.3 .10. 3 -0.8 8.7 13.4 11.9 
10 24.5 12.0 -1.6 11.7 OT — jL •-» • 1.2 
11 19.2 11.1 -1.8 22. 4 34:9 -15,7 
12 25. 1 18.0 O * 1 32. 3 SO. 4 -25. 3 
1984 41.8 25. 2 -5.5 49.2 66.6 -24.8 
1 37.a 17.2 -2.9 37.5 52.7 -14.9 
2 39.2 20.7 40.. 0 54.3 -15. 1 
3 28 .'3 17.8 -2.9 40.6 54.0 -25.7 
4 37,9 18. 2 -4. 1 40. 7 55 w 9 -18.0 
5 44.5 20. 3 -6. 0 43.3 60. 4 -15.9 
6 43. 4 24. 2 -8.3 52.5 76.9 "" O -M* • iJ 
7 57.4 * -8.0 58. 3 78.3 -20. 9 
8 44.8 29.7 -6.0 60.5 78. 1 -33. 3 
9 40. 4 27.8 -7.5 62.9 86.8 -46. 4 
10 54. 1 27. 9 -6. 1 58. 9 79 ."9 -25. 8 
11 42.9 • i—i -5.7 51.6 68.3 -25.4 
12 31.3 30 • 2 -6.5 42.9 52.4 lii 
1985 
1 18.3 36.4 -3.8 37.5 46.0 -27.7 
8.7 25.3 -6.4 34.9 41.7 -33.0 3 12.9 27 . 5 -7. 1 34.6 42.6 -29. 7 4 17.8 24.0 -11.2 32.9 39.3 -21. 5 5 6.4 29.5 -7.8 30. 9 33.4 -27.0 
6 A. . kJ 20.3 -7.3 22.2 18. 1 -20.6 7 -9.3 9.9 -7. 1 16.8 13. 1 -22.4 
8 -3. 4 9. 0 -8.7 13.6 9.9 
9 -1.0 14.2 -8.0 11.5 5.2 -6.2 
10 -6.3 13.2 -9.2 12.2 1.0 -7.5 
11 -1.3 12.0 -10. l' 10.8 -1.1 -CjK2 
Sources 
PIDS Monograph no. 8 
Phil. Development, third Quarter 1986 
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chides the larger adjustments•that were carried out in smaller 
enterprises. The level of employment which had already Jaeen 
falling in 1983, fell by as high ag 8~percenfc-Aft June_&nd July, 
1984 for these large companies. The rate of decline of employment 
levels peaked at 11 percent in May 1985. 
The last column of Table 2.7 subtracts the rate of growth of 
the wholesale price index from the value of production as a 
measure of real output declines in these top 200 corporations. In 
October 1984, the rate of decline in real output of these 
companies peaked at 46 percent. For all the months in 1984 and 
1985, there was a consistent fall in real output from the same 
month in the previous year. 
2.3 Supply Side Adjustment Policies 
To do a just evaluation of the IMF program we must discuss the 
other interventions that were part of the adjustment package that 
were directly related to the dejnand substitution and the supply 
side aspects of the program. 
First, let us discuss the foreign trade and foreign exchange 
aspect of the program. In 23 June 1983, the government devalued 
the peso by 7.8 percent, to Pll to $1. The government seemed 
determined to defend this rate for the rest of the year, until 
the Aquino assassination occurred. On 5 October 1983, it was 
forced to devalue to P14 to $1. 
The initial response of the Marcos regime to the onset of 
the crisis in 1983 was to attempt to ration foreign exchange. In 
November 1983, the government created foreign exchange pool for 
priority import payments by requiring all banks to surrender 100 
16a 
percent of their foreign exchange receipts r this requirement was 
reduced to 80 percent "in June 1984. The government set priorities 
in the allocation of foreign exchange to crude o i l i m p o r t s , raw 
materials, supplies, inputs of export products, essential grain 
imports, and raw materials for 'vital' domestic industries. The 
government also imposed ceilings for payments and new import 
letters of credit.<14> 
On 6 June 1984, the government was forced to devalue again 
to P18 to $1. In preparation for the IMF agreement in December 
1984, the government abolished the foreign exchange priority 
program in 15 December 1984 and gradually permitted private banv-
to keep an: increasing percentage of their foreign exchange 
receipts. 
It was in the nature of the authoritarian regime that just 
as it was officially liberalizing the foreign exchange market, it 
had managed to impose its will on the foreign exchange 
blackmarket. This -was carried out, reportedly under the 
supervision of the former trade and industry minister, who is now 
facing tax evasion charges in connection with the operation under 
the new Aquino government. The government guaranteed to the large 
traders the wherewithal with which to ship the foreign exchange 
out to Hong Kong.<15> 
In exchange, the government dominated the determination of 
the exchange rate. A January 1987 investigation has revealed «fc!fet 
five government corporations under the control of the ministry of 
trade and industry experienced huge losses in connection with the 
operation to control thte foreign exchange blackmarket. 
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As part of its revenue raising efforts (since trade taxes 
(are relatively easy to collect), new trade taxes were imposed in 
the beginning of the crisis. An additional ad valorem duty on 
imports which started at 3 percent and peaked at 10 percent by 
June 1984 was imposed. The additional import duty alone accounted 
for the P2.6 billiori out of P6.9 billion, 38 percent and the 
largest, additional tax measures in 1984. 
Additional export duties were imposed on eixports the 
greatest of which was an economic stabilization tax of 30 percent 
in addition to existing export duties in June 1984. A foreign 
exchange transaction tax of 1 percent was imposed on 15 October 
1984, just as the governn it was ostensibly freeing the foreign 
exchange market. 
rrne export taxes were later suspended in preparation for the 
IMF agreement at the end of December. 
Thus, as the crisis was beginning and devaluations became 
unavoidable, the government was actually increasing the ad 
valorem tax- rates on imports and exports and engineering a 
redistribution of income from the private sector to the 
government. Krugman and Taylor [1978] have earlier illustrated 
the contractionary influence of devaluation with ad valorem trade 
taxes. 
As the data will show in the next section, devaluations 
sparked an unprecedented inflationary process at the start of* the 
crisis. This prevented real devaluation from taking place. In 
addition, the government's import qontrol program provided 
additional impetus for import speculation, which fueled inflation 
even more. On top of this, the additional import taxes were being 
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passed on directly to local consumers. 
It is difficult- to defend the position that the nominal 
devaluations had gone any distance to reduce the overvaluation 
that had characterized trade policy before the crisis. Because of 
the import surcharges and the inflation at the beginning, it was 
only until June 1984 that the devaluation was some, though 
slight, advantage to exports and import substitutes. At this 
point, there was a 50.9 percent net effective change in the 
exchange rate while the GDP deflator had changed by 46.7 percent 
and the compensatioh rate index had changed by 23.4 percent. 
In 1985, with the IMF support well in hand, the exchange 
rate actually appreciated in real terms. £n an oligopolistic 
market setting, devaluation plus import controls is inflationary; 
but appreciation or tne currency w i n not be deflationary. The 
deceleration of inflation in 1985 was mostly induced by the deep 
internal recession and helped by the slow recovery of output. 
The adjustment period also saw many changes in the price 
control programs of the government. At the end of the program, 
the price control programs on basic commodities had been 
eliminated. 
The authoritarian government characteristically had a 
significant program of socialized pricing. Thirteen 'basic' 
commodities, including rice, chicken, eggs, and milk were subject * • 
to price ceilings. In addition, prices of petroleum products wer/ 
regulated. 
The initial response of the government to the inflation was 
to attempt to aggressively revise price ceilings on basic 
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commodities. The pressures to revise ceilings were coming from 
suppliers, who would withdraw supply in response to delays in 
price increases, and the pressures were irresistable after each 
peso devaluation. As we noted in Section 1, rice and corn prices 
had to be immediately adjusted to devaluation because peso 
fertilizer prices went up in response. 
Finally., in October 1984/ also in preparation for the IMF 
program the government removed all price controls except for 
rice. The rice ceiling was removed in anticipation of the rice 
harvest in 1985. The removal of the price control program on 
basic commodities did not induce further inflationary pressures 
in 1985 because of the depressed state of demand and employment 
in thiat year. 
As we showed in Section 1, the peso prices of petroleum 
products have an immediate and large scale effect on domestic 
inflation. The increases in peso oil prices in the period up to 
end of 1984 were due _t.o .the devaluations , and the import 
surcharges jyftat the government imposed in an effort to raise tax 
revenue. About 39 jpercent of the. .for^j&xample*, was j 
contributed by government tax and price stabilization j 
interventions. Between July 1983 and December 1984, the average 
peso price of petroleum products increased by 129.7 percent. 
In 1985, even as world crude prices were beginning to 
soften, the peso price of petroleum products remained constant. 
In fact, it was in 1985 when the shift of taxation on petroleum 
products to ad valorem basis provided new revenue in the amount 
of P2.1 billion. Thus. because of fiscal considerations, the 
government, operating as any domestic oligopolist and justified 
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by the objective to studiously attain the goals of the IMP 
program then in its first year of official operation, did not 
pass on the effect of a steadier exchange rate and lower world 
prices to domestic petroleum prices. A passing on of lower oil 
prices would have had a non-inflationary reflatiorrary effect in 
1985. 
As part of the IMF program, government administered prices 
were increased. Jhe utility programs of the government were its 
most significant foreign borrowers and there was a long term need 
to improve the internal cash generation of these.utilities. The 
price increases that had been implemented in the program were 
however more directly related to increases in petroleum and other 
costs induced by the devaluation. Average water tariff rates were 
increased by 50 percent, while average power tariff rose by 64 
percent in the period. The government did start a long term 
program to reduce the electric tariff subsidy to small users but 
did hot make significant headway because of an abrupt adjustment 
would have caused large price increases for poor urban users. 
We can say that the positive aspect of these changes in the 
price control program is that the government had finally, by 
force of circumstances, shed off its obligation to control the 
prices of basic commodities. 
With respect to petroleum and utility prices, the^ 
interventions here were inflationary and, because of 
circumstances, did not result in a better "set of relative prices. 
In the case of wages, the government increased minimum wages 
three times in 1984, by a total of 77 percent in nominal terms 
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between the end of 1983 and the end of 1984. By November 1984, 
because of the inflation, the real minimum wage in 1978 prices 
had fallen slightly from P17.78 per day in December 1983 to 
P17.13 in Manila.<16> 
In normal times, minimum wages apply only to the Jormal 
private sector, which would include no more than 15 percent of 
the employed labor force. The degree of compliance has been poor. 
Based on inspections, and inspections are not evenly carried out, 
9 percent of establishments were found violating minimum wage 
legislation between, 1976 and 1979. To compound the problem, the 
labor ministry approved 57 percent of . 340 applications for 
exemption from minimum wage legislation on the ground that the 
crisis had made tnese companies distressed. 
In the financial sector, the Philippines has had a long 
history of anti-usury ceilings on interest rates*. A financial 
liberalization program that began in July 1981 when interest rate 
ceilings were lifted on all types of deposits and loans, except 
for short-term loans. interest rate ceilings on short-term loans 
were lifted in January 1983. Thus,. as far as the appearance of 
'liberalization' was concerned the government had undertaken 
significant steps. 
However, the very same liberalization program wfcs biased 
towards- bigness, a reature tnat naa oeen suggestea Dy tne woria 
Bank design team itself. The program involved increases in 
minimum capital requirements, justified as permitting banks to 
exploit economies or scale (a rather dubious proposition) and to 
provide banks with a larger base for intermediation into long 
term lending. It was also a feature that specialization of 
16a 
financial functions would be sacrificed in favor of large 
'universal banks' that could internalize tbe intermediation 
process. 
The financial liberalization program was also accompanied by 
the quantum leap in rediscounting activities of the Central Bank. 
Rediscounts were made available for many different types of 
projects: sugar trading, small and medium scale industries, metal 
financing, manpower exporting, coconut milling, and so on. 
Between 1981 and 1984, the amount of rediscounting the commercial 
banks achieved was more than twice the amount in the previous ten 
years. 
The overall .effect of the liberalization program was a more 
pronounced oligopolistic structure (and a more irresistable 
constituency against free entry) and, before the start of the 
crisis, minimal increases in the deposit rate. Loan rates did not 
seem to be materially affected since even before liberalization, 
banks had been quite agile in charging going interest rates by 
tacking on service charges to loan agreements. 
At the start of the crisis, the Central Bank was forced by 
circumstances to shut down its extensive rediscounting operations 
and concentrate its rediscountring resources to vital projects. 
En January' 1984, the Central Bank finally achieved the situation 
In which the rate on rediscounting was based on the current cost 
Df credit. 
The financial crisis that began in L981 and exacerbated by 
the adjustment program left six major banks under the control of 
•he government. In some of these banks, government deposits are 
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being maintained to keep their operations; in others loans had 
been converted into equity. These problems have exacerbated the 
national government's demand for financing. 
Thus the adjustment period .had the positive effect of 
dismantling the byzantine rediscounting operation of the Central 
Bank. Because of the high interest rates in 1984, deposit rates 
for small depositors had finally increased to as high as 15 
percent as commercial banks were forced to defend themselves from 
withdrawals by depositors attempting to move into Central Bank 
bills. 
The negative effects of a weaker and more oligopolistic 
financial sector have been more pronounced. The real sector of 
the Philippine economy is still trying to extricate itself from 
the rise in the intermediation spread, which for large commercial 
banks was in the rahge of 7 to 8 percent in 1985, that was 
^ induced by the crisis, even as nominal interest rates on secured 
loans fell to the 13 percent in 1986. 
In many of the relative price issues we have discussed 
above, the problem of government financing had swamped efforts to 
address supply side issues in the adjustment. Table 2.8 
f reproduces the government revenue program in the crisis. In 1984, 
26 percent of tax revenue came from income/wealth taxes, 33.5 
percent from trade taxes, and 33.3 percent from excise and sales 
taxes. There is a pressing need to carry out long term reforms to 
reduce the reliance of the tax system on trade and sales taxes. 
In the nature of ,the situation, however, income and wealth 
taxes are the most difficult to raise in the short period of an 
adjustment. An examination of Table 2.8 shows that while this 
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Table 2.8 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROGRAM 
1983 1984 1985 
1. Increase in specific tax on 
petroleum products baned on 
July 1983 to June 1984 measures 90.6 753.7 
2. Additional export duty 44.9 433.0 
3. Economic stabilization tax 282.0 
4. Additional import duty 1,732.9 2,635.5 3,298.0 
5* Increase in specific tax on 
alcoholic beverages 276.0 655.0 
6. Increase in specific tax on , 
distilled spirits 111.0 
7. Imposition of ad valorem tax on 
fermented liquors 100.0 1,034.0 
8. Increase in percentage tax on 
services 515.0 
9. Increase in documentary stamp tax 100.0 640.0 
10. 1 percent tax on foreign exchange 450.0 2,900.0 
11. Removal of exemptions on interest 
income 294.0 2,014.0 
12. Shifting of some elements of 
specific tax to an ad valorem 
basis on petroleum products 209.0 2,131.0 
13. Increase in ad valorem tax on 
domestic crude oil 107.0 209.0 
14. Increase in specific tax on 
imported coal and coke 16.0 16.0 
15. Rationalization of customs duties 
on com, coal and coke 31.0 36.0 
16. Imposition of ad valorem tax on 
cigarettes and increase in specific 
tax on the same 250.0 881.0 
17. Increase in tax rates oh private 
motor vehicles 45.0 457.0 
18. Increase in airport passenger fees 30.0 150.C 
19. Withdrawal of tax exemptions on 
government corporations 383.0 1,100.0 
20. Withdrawal of preferential tax 
treatment of certain business 
enterprises 200.0 1,590.0 
21. Change in inventory valuation 
procedures 40.0 120.0 
22. Improvement in sales tax 
administration 100.0 = 
Total 1,868.4 6,935.2 17,857.0 
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program had been worked out. with the IMF and while we have to 
admit that the IMF recognizes the need for long term tax reform, 
these reforms could not be carried out in the adjustment. 
In fact, the tax program is extremely regressive for the 
basic reason that regressive taxes are easiest to impose 
politically (even, it turns out, in a dictatorship) and the 
easiest to collect. For example, a tax on interest income of 17 
percent penalized heavily small depositors whose income tax rates 
would typically, not exceed ten percent; however, the tax was 
easily collectible*from the banking system. As Table 2.8 shows, 
taxing all interest income at a fixed rate provided a revenue 
increase of P2.0 billion in 1985 alone. 
An example of a failed attempt to rely more heavily on 
income and wealth taxes was the proposal by the government in 
1984 to change the assessment basis for the real estate tax from 
1978 values to 1984 values. The middle class successfully 
resisted this proposed tax. The new Aquino government announced 
the same - 1984 basis - policy at the end of 1986 and found 
itself in January 1987 having to suspend its implementation. 
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3.0 Impact of Adjustment Measures 
We now discuss the results of the adjustment measures undertaken 
by the Marcos government on the Philippine economy. 
3.1 The Path of Adjustment 
Data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide the levels of important 
variables in the recent adjustment. These data, converted to 
annual growth rates, form basis for the graphs on which the 
subsequent discussion is based. 
The crisis began in the third quarter of 1983 when GNP was 
growing at 1.8 percent per year (see Chart 1 for the graph of GDP 
and GNP growth rates). GNP growth rate plunges to almost 12 
percent per year in the third quarter of 1984. Real GNP growth 
rate remains negative until the first quarter of 1986. It plunges 
again in the second quarter of 1986 with the change in 
government. The actual IMF adjustment program begins in the first 
quarter of 1985, but the recovery to positive growth shows a 
decided recovery even before this. GDP growth rate is negative 
until the third quarter of 1986. 
The rates of growth of total investment are depicted in 
Chart 2. Under the monetarist program, real investment spending 
has been declining consistently since the third quarter of 1983. 
Private construction spending has been pacing the fall in 
investment (Chart 3) with declines of over 30 percent per year in 
42 
Table. .3.1 
Prices and Nonetary Variables 
Exchange Interest Total Money 
Consumer Rate on 91 Day Honey Liquidity Multiplier 
Price Index •(Pesos per Treasury Supply !H3> (Liquidity/ 
ir.Month (1972=100) US Dollar! Bills (P Million} IP Million) Money Supply) 
1982.01 353.0 8.2542 13,036 21424 80696 3.77597 
1982.02 355.5 B.2830 13.378 21721 32295 3.78875 
1982.03 357.2 8.3405 13.579 22330 85493 3.B2857 
1982.04 359.5 8.3792 13.591 22614 85783 3.79341 
1982.05 360.5 B.4161 . 13.980 22990 B7189 3.79244 
1982.06 362.6 8.4502 14.014 22471 87596 3.89815 
1982.07 369.1 8.4878 14.IBS 21313 87371 4.09944 
1982;08 ,371.6 8.5293 13.765 21134 8S30S 4.17852 
1982.09 373.3 8.6380 13.922 20963 . 89636 4.27596 
1982.10 373.9 8.7664 13.935 21114 89449 4.23654 
1982, 11 374.5 8.9752 14.004 21259 91704 4.31370. 
1982.12 374.7 9.0594 14.027 23525 95298 4.05101 
1983.01 37). 0 9.2865, 14.043 22246 94731 4.25838 
1983.02 378.9 9.4644 14.047 22012 95476 4.33739 
1983.03 379. B 9.6057 14.043 22165 96775 4.36614 
1993.04 381.7 9.8693 14,043 .22412 9741B 4.34673 
1983.05 384.4 10.0316 13.988 23537 98710 4.193B6 
1983.06 389.0 10.3553 13.561 23040 99789 4.33105 
1983.07 398.3 11.0017 13.704 22690 99250 4.37414 
1983.08 405.5 11.0016 14.061 23061 99548 4.31676 
1983.09 407.2 11.0018 14.299 23503 100723 4.2B550 
1983.10 412.3 13.7016 14.577 26432 103607 3.91973 
1983.11 437.6 14.0020 15.038 28306 107851 3.81014 
1983.12 472.4 14.0020 15.382 32518 112962 3.473B1 
1984.01 502.5 14.0020 15.500 30673 112153 3.65641 
1984.02 517.7 14.0020 16.400 28997 112497 3.87961 
1984.03 529.2 14.0020 16.500 30176 116259 3.85270 
1984.04 537.2 14.0020 16.600 31727 116248 3,66401' 
1984.05 546.2 14.0020 18.400 31470 114928 3.65199, 
1984.06 580.5 17.4020 25.400 31500 112036 3.55670 
1984.07 632.5 18.0020 31.600 34950 111303 3.1B464 
1984.08 650.2 18.0020 33.500 33242 110349 3.31957 
1984.09 666.1 18.0020 37,800 31528 108246 3.43396 
1984.10 675.4 19.1482 42.000 30722 108165 3.52077 
1984.11 702.7 19.9590 43.000 30796 110911 3.60147 
1984.12 712.5 19.8593 42.200 33633 121215 3.60405 
1985.01 730.0 18.9794 35.200 30935 122298 3.95339 
1985.02 736.7 18.2557 31.000 29493 122907 4.16733 
1985.03 739.7 IB.4778 33;300 29632 120247 4.05801 
19B5.04 736.2 18.4930 34.t)00 -29859 120496 4.03550 
1985.05 737.4 18.4900 33.400 29098 118733 4.08045 
1985.06 741.2 18.4650 30.600 29067 121251 4.17143 
1985.07 751.4 18.6660. 25.000 28393 117297 4.13119 
1985.08 753.3 18.6050 19.800 28462 119826 4.21003 
1985.09 750.7 18.6400 17.900 28999 123396 4.25518 
1985.10 748.2 18.7550 17.000 28751 122695 4.26750 
1985.11 750.1 18.7580 16.600 29347 122733 4.18213 
1985.12 752. B 19.0320 .16.400 35027 121152 3.38158 
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Table 3 . 2 
Real Variables 
(Constant 1972 Pesc-s) 
Gross Dos. Fixed Total Government Private 
Personal Gavernaent Capital Capita! Cons- .Cons- Cons-
G D P S N F er Ccnsii«p.tion Consumption For sat ion for act ion t ruc t ion t ruc t ion t ruc t ion Exports Imports 
.1. 14265 2199 7237 5751 2956. 1274 1682 4352 4815 24255 
24157 
2.2 15519 2262 6415 5875 3326 1488 1836 4585 4800 249b? 246U 
2.3 15741 2290 6852 6213 2930 1252 1728 4336 4980 • 22927 224&S 
"l.t 18010 2394 5763 5848 3259 1345 1914 •4477 4372' 26B20 26290 
3.1 14837 2276 6981 5873 3148 1234 1914 4459 4344 25251 24838 
3.2 
j3.3 
1539B . 2311 7098 6426 3832 1700 2124 5090 4966 • 25706 25763 
16007' 2197 5376 5578 2423 533 1890 4819 4913 22960 22878 
33.4 15256 2004 5572 5135 2545 900 1645 4317 4966 2&151 25288 
64.1 15021 2242 4653 4732 2963 990 1976 4621 3940 24519 23707 
16073 2117 4563 4477 2617 924 1893 5048 4323 25314 24822 
64.3 16241 . 2003 3296 3767 1929 482" i447. 5.482 4821 .20655 20165 
'34.4 18698 1893 3349 3565 1732 589 1143 5695 5091 23728 23239 
85.1 15144 2055 3446 3400 1986 678 130B 5088 3224 22725 21994 
?85.2 16088 2027 3502 3793 2432 637 1595 4880 3678 23B18 23520 
985.3 16240 2052 2719 3280 1842 617 1225 4823 3791 20479 19750 
965.4 18690 2071 2898 2241 648 210 438 4560 3302 23422 '23143 
986.1 15343 . 2131 3261 3192 1794 879 915 511.4 3634 22549 22164 
986.2 . 16174 1976 2177 2362 948 415 533 6516 4432 ,23196 22679 
986.3 16248 2103 274! 2861 1407 767 640 6127 4220 .20660 200a
1} 
966.4 18913 2170 .250,7 2284 834 283 551 5846 4193 .24200 2359J 
42b 
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1984 and over 60 percent in 1985, the first 12 months of the IMF 
program. 
With the high cost of financing, real imports have been 
falling, and they fell most precipitously in 1985, the first year 
of the IMF program (Chart 4). Exports (Chart 5) showed a recovery 
in 1984 with U.S. trade deficit financed world export boom in 
that year, but fell deeply, to as low as minus 19.9 percent in 
the fourth quarter of 1985. This fall is attributable to declines 
in world prices of traditional products such as coconut oil, the 
fall in semiconductor chipsexports due to the worldwide fall in 
aemana, ana tne -Loss or export markets which began in 1984 as 
domestic exporters found packing costs financing to be 
prohibitive at the prevailing interest rates. 
Before the onset of the crisis, the annual inflation rate as 
measured by the consumer price index was running at 7.3' percent. 
A look at Chart 6 reveals that during the period of the 
adjustment, the inflation rate shot up to a peak of 63 percent 
before settling back down to around 5 percent per year by the end 
of 1985. Thus a severe inflationary period characterized the 
adjustment process in the Philippines. 
Chart 6 provides an 'indication that the exchange rate, a 
factor that is predicted as inflationary in both the monetarist 
and structuralist models had at least a simultaneous relationship 
with inflation during the period. The first steep rise in the 
inflation rate that occurred between the third and fourth 
quarters of 1983 coincided with the first steep (nominal) 
16a 
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devaluation that occurred in the same period. A casual 
examination of Chart 6 shows the leading role that devaluation 
j 
has played on inflation in the recent adjustment. 
The important role of the monetary sector in the adjustment 
period is shown in Chart 7 which shows the annual growth rate in 
the monetary base graphed along with the inflation rate. The 
monetary base seems to exhibit a coincident relationship to the 
inflation rate until July 1984 as Philippine authorities were 
forced by circumstances and their imperatives for survival to 
finance their immediate requirements, especially in connection 
with the May 1984 parliamentary elections. Beyond that, the 
monetary base is completely consistent with either prior action 
commitments or with IMF program targets. In this case monetary 
barse has a decidedly negative trend. 
One of the more notable features of the recent adjustment is 
that reserve money does not seem to have a positive relationship 
with output. The explanation is found in Charts 8 and 9. It is 
total liquidity and the cost of credit that has a positive 
relationship to real economic activity. The growth rate in 
nominal liquidity has been falling since January 1984, inspite of 
the fact that monetary bkse had been increasing until July 1984, 
as noted earlier. The decline in liquidity growth had beer 
engineered through the drastic fall in intermediation and £his is 
shown in Chart 8 as the drastic fall in the ratio of tota 
liquidity ^nd monetary base, the 'multiplier'. Real liquidity 
shown in Chart 9, practically follows the pattern of real GDP 
16a 
For these reasons, the recent adjustment program in the 
Philippines has to be called monetarist. 
Chart 10 graphs the inflation rate against the rate of 
interest and the real GNP growth rate. In this this case the 
series th^t is graphed is the level of the interest and not 
changes in the level of interest. Beginning in the first quarter 
of 1984, the interest ralie starts to mimic the inflation rate 
reaching a coincident peak with the.inflation rate in the third 
quarter of 1984. On the basis of current nominal interest rate 
minus current consumer price index inflation rate, the real 
interest rate is negative from the start of the crisis until the 
second quarter of 1985. This development is at least consistent 
with the disintermediation strategy of the government. 
3.2 Actual Results of Adjustment 
On the basis of the most commonly used indicators, the 
Philippines had successfully completed a macroecortomic adjustment 
by the end of 1985, six months ahead of the completion of the 
then current IMF program. 
Beginning* from current account account deficits of ,$3.1 
billion in 1982 and $2.5 billion in 1983, representing 7.9 
percent and 8.1 percent of GNP in the respective years, the 
country had achieved by 1985 a current account surplus of $8 
million. Inflation, which had peaked at 63 percent per year in 
1984, had declined to 5.7 percent per year by December 1985. The 
Philippines had also paid off all the arrears in the servicing of 
16a 
its foreign liabilities that had arisen as a result of the crisis 
- except for those that had been explicitly restructured in 
accordance to the adjustment program. 
The unqualified success in achieving the balance of payments 
targets is shown in Table 3.3. By 1984, in one year's time, the 
merchandise trade deficit had been reduced from $2.5 billion to 
$0.6 biiiioh, by 72 percent. Even before exceptional financing, 
the Philippines reduced its overall balance of payments deficit 
between 1983 and 1984 by 33 percent, from a $2.2 billion to $1.5 
billion. 
As we had pointed put earlier and as the IMF itself noted, 
much of the painful stabilization measures had actually been put 
in place in 1984 as prior action commitments. 
The final success of the 'adjustment' for a program that was 
supposed to have ended in June 1986 is embodied in the February 
1986 3.8 inflation rate and the $8 million current account 
surplus achieved for the year 1985. For the year 1985 the actual 
end-period inflation rate was 5.7 percent versus the target of 
10-15 percent. The 1985 target for the current account according 
to Table 2.3 was a deficit of 1,1 billion dollars 1 
Did actual adjustment, in terms of an improvement in the 
current account that provides the basis for recovery, take place? 
The answer has to be no if one analyzes the record which I have 
attempted to summarize in Table 3.4. 
16a 
Table 3.3 
Balance of Payments 
(in lillion *) 
19B4 1985 
Before After Before After 
Exceptional Exceptional Exceptional Exceptional 
Itea 1992 1983 Financing Financing Financing Financing 
Merchandise Trade -2,646 -2,482 -679 -679 -482 -482 Exports 5,021 5,005 5,391 5,391 4,629 - 4,629 
: laports 7,667 7,487 •6,070 6,070 5,111 5,111 Non-Merchandise -1,040 -740 -975 -975 111 111 Inflow 2,983 3,127 2,626 2,626 3,288 3.2BB Outflow 4,023 3,867 3,601 3,601 3,177 3,177 
Transfers) net 486 472 386 386 379 379 
Current Account -3,200 -2,750 -1,268 -1,268 8 B 
Lonq-teri Loans 1,848 1,347 -271 258 -784 2727 Inflow 2,533 2,-336 730 1,259 670 4181 Outflow 9fl5 989 1,001 1,001 1,454 1,454 Direct Invest, net 17 112 6 6 -9 -9 
Short-ten Cap, net -263 -618 18 549 -1,526 -1,398 Errors & Oaissipns/ 
Bold Honetization/ 
Reval. Adjustments 277 -254 60 53 771 771 
Capital Account 1,579 587 -187 1,068 -1548 2091 
Unreiittable arrears/ 
adjustments - - 698 
Overall Balance •1,621 -2,163 -1,455 -200 -1,540 2,789 
Change in net 
Int'l Reserves n.f. -1.011 446 446 991 991 Decrease in non~ 
Nonetary Arrears n.f. -1,152 -646 -646 1,798 1,798 Exceptional 
Financing n.a. - -1,255 - -3,631 -
Unrentable 
Arrears/Adj. n.a. - - - -698 -
n.f. = no figure available 
n.a. = not applicable 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippine 
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in the first place, export volumes consistently decreased 
during the two years of the adjustment. The year 1984 was a boom 
year for developing country exports, but value of Philippine 
exports grew by only 7.7 percent (against a target of 10 percent) 
and volumes fell by 2.6 percent. The poor export performance in 
1984 is blamed by many exporters on their inability to maintain 
supply to their foreign customers because of the high cost of 
credit (which could not be compensated by the real devaluation in 
that year) and the uncertain political climate. 
The volume decline of exports in 1985 reflects the 
cumulation of the strains introduced in 1984, the continued high 
cost of credit, and the actual appreciation of the peso in that 
year (last line of Table 3.4). 
Actual adjustment was achieved through a fall in . injports 
mainly in • industrial inputs and capital goods. The fall in 
capital goods imports is reflected in the 36.7 percent and 20.7 
percent fall in capital formation for 1984 and 1985 respectively 
while the fall in industrial inputs is reflected in the 10.9 
percent and 10.5 percent fall in real industrial output in those 
two years. 
Merchandise import value fell by 18.9 percent in 1984 and 
15.5 percent in 1985 bringing about an adjustment in the current 
account inspite of the poor export performance. In 1985, the 
value of merchandise exports actually fell by 14.2 percent but 
nevertheless a current account surplus was achieved in that year 
through the fall in imports. 
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Table 3.4 
The Adjustments The Way and thp Truth 
Merchandise imports 
Value ,(US $> 
Volume (see note 1 below) 
Merchandise Imports 
Value (US *) 
Volume (see note 1 below) 
Change -from Previous Year 
1984 1985 
7,7 —14.2 
- 2 . 6 
-18.9 -15.7 
-31.9 -13.9 
-12.2 -15.5 
-32.3 -31.1 
Non-oil industrial materials import! 
.Value (US S) 
Capital g o o d s imports Value (US $) 
Grosa National Product, Real " 3 - 8 
3.2 Output -from Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
Expenditures on 
Personal consumption 
General government consumption 
Capital -formation 
? A- • kJ 
—10.9 -10.5 
-2.3 -1.0 
1.5 0.2 
-6.1 -0-6 
-36.7. -20.7 
Reserve Money (End-June level) 6S.5 16.8 -78.6' Net foreign assets 
Net .domestic assets 74.9 2.5 
Central bank credits to 
Central government 
Deposit money banks- . ^ 
Others (see note. 2 below) 195.4 1^.4 
56.5 -27.9 
-47.2 -5B..9 
Reserve Money Net of Other Credits -188.3 20.4 
(End-June level) 
Interest Rate on 91 day Treasury Bills 42.2 16.5 
#Level in December, percentage points 
Consumer Price Index (December level) 50.8 5.7 
21.8 -7.2 Real' Exchange Rate <Resos per foreign • curren'cy) 
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The heavy reliance on monetarist adjustment, authoritarian 
government style, is shown in Table 3.4 as nominal reserve money 
net "of 'blocked' other credit fell by 188.3 percent in 1984 and 
20.4 percent in 1985. Even monetarists would probably consider a 
fall in reserve money available to the financial system as a real 
measure of credit tightness during the period. 
At the end of the adjustment period, the exchange rate, 
which had been consistently overvalued in the seventies and which 
embodies the country's inadequate long-run adjustment, has begun 
to appreciate again. A reversal of this trend will be necessary 
to set the stage for growth. 
16a 
4.0 Alternative Adjustment Strategies 
Irrespective of one's political attitude, the fall of the Marcos 
government in the midst of an adjustment program, 13 months into 
an Official IMF program/ must be interpreted as an indirect 
indication of the innappropriateness of the macroeconomic 
strategy that it pursued. 
This section discusses some possible alternative adjustment 
strategies that might have been pursued. These suggestions would 
have all the disadvantages of being made in hindsight 
particularly since the government to which these suggestions are 
being made has been consigned to the dustbin of history. It is 
entirely possible that the policies implemented by the fallen 
regime were the only actions it could have undertaken. 
However, the fact that, upon its assumption of power in 
February 19-86, the new Aquino government saw fit to retain the 
Central Bank governor who had had the prime responsibility for 
carrying the most destructive of those policies suggests to us 
that the lessons from that period have not been learned and there 
is still some value to providing- some patently hypothetical 
suggestions to the unlamented authoritarian government at this 
late stage. 
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4.1 Political Parameters in the Adjustment Program 
At this point, let us first identify th^ e immediate constraints 
within which the authoritarian regime had to operate. 
First, the dictatorship had to re-establish a good working 
relationship with the IMF and the international banks if it were 
not to lose the support of the government in the United States 
and other governments in the Western alliance. 
Second, the dictatorship had to deflect public criticisms of 
these governments' support for the regime by carrying out and 
winning in open election exercises. The Aquino assassination had 
created a wide rift within the ruling classes. Election exercises 
were necessary to legitimize the regime in the eyes of the world. 
These election exercises were also serving the purpose of laying 
down the moral basis for cracking down on those members of the 
ruling classes which opposed the dictatorship.<17> 
Third, the dictatorship had to maintain the resources of its 
band of supporters and maintain its capability to reward and 
punish materially in the face of the domestic political challenge 
that it faced. 
4.2 Adjustments Since 1980 
All the suggestions that we make here have to be evaluated in the 
r • 
light of these constraints. 
The first suggestion that must be made with respect to the 
Philippine experience is that economic adjustment "should have 
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commenced in 1980 in response to the looming domestic financial 
crisis that laid bare the innapropriateness of the previous 
investment strategy.<18> After 1980, the Philippines was 
basically borrowing short-term to sustain payments on medium and 
long term debt. Almost half the national de»t was incurred 
between 1980 and 1983. 
The dictatorship did seem to attempt to implement various 
programs that would normally be classified as adjustment 
oriented. The most important of these were the. structural 
adjustment loans with the World Bank that combine import 
liberalization with financing to key manufacturing sectors, such 
as the the textile industry, to make these more export 
competitive. These programs, however, did not succeed in 
significantly inducing adjustment. 
In the first place, the Marcos regime did not have the 
political capability to carry out these programs as they were 
intended. T,he country did meet the schedule of reducing this 
(arithmetic) average tariff rate from 43 percent in 1980 to 28 
percent in 1985. In the meantime, however, the currency continued 
to appreciate in real terms and the program to remove 
quantitative restrictions ' was being subverted through the 
mechanism of increasing the participation in the import trade of 
government corporations and private companies operating undfer 
incentives and protection, many directly provided for by 
presidential decree. 
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Moreover, a more aggressive exchange rate stance would have 
inducedv significant loss of the support from the ruling classes 
(something that eventually happened after the Aquino 
assassination and the subsequent election exercises), 
Furthermore, the removal of the quantitative restriction system 
would have contradicted the regime's program to .enrich its 
allies. Ah import control system has the advantage that it can be 
directly applied to favoring some economic actors as opposed to 
Others. In any event, what happened was that the Bretton Woods 
agencies di'd not abandon the regime in 1980 when there were more 
resources for an orderly adjustment but finally did so in 1983. 
In the second place, the adjustment program might not have 
succeeded even if it had been implemented as 'designed*. The 
country did not have much access to foreign financing, except in 
the short term, to finance the investment that would have been 
required for such an adjustment. The investment climate was so 
poor the funds that had been received for the textile- industry 
program were not even half utilized. The country's growth 
consistently decelerated from 1980 until the crisis struck. 
3.3 A Gradual .Stabilization Starting 1983 
Let us now discuss some alternative strategies assuming that 
adjustment could only have begun in 1983. Ih these suggestions we 
assume that an overall program could have been designed: and 
implemented, with or without the support of the Bretton Woods 
agencies. The following elements seem to be important. 
1. As we have1 shown above, the government's budget deficits 
that had started to explode before tne crisis had been 
principally caused by its need to finance the servicing of 
foreign debt that had been incurred by its financial and non-
financial corporations. A solution to this problem would1 have 
been a project for which the Bre'tton Woods agencies would have 
been eminently qualified to have lent support. 
A solution to this problem would have been the real key to 
the 1983 balance of payments crisis. When tne crisis oegan, tne 
economy was being operated by encouraging the inflow of short 
term debt in order to service previous commitments on the foreign 
debt. "This strategy conditioned all the macroeconomic policies 
that were being pursued. No truly adjustment oriented policies 
could have been seriously considered unless this problem was 
first addressed. 
There are a few policies that would have been indispensable 
in this a;ffort. 
1.1 The government should have begun a serious effort to 
collect all debt payments overdue from private borrowers to 
government financial institutions. 
The political enormity of this task stems from the reality 
that the effort would have required the regime to ask its 
strongest supporters to remit part of their foreign assets back 
to the country. Given that eventually the Marcos dictatorship was 
toppled from power, the inability of the Marcos group to stage a 
16a 
return of foreign assets is an example of time inconsistent 
behavior. 
1.2 The government should not have viewed the problem as 
solely that of the reopening of trade credits but should have 
begun a serious renegotiation of foreign debt service and 
guarantee liabilities. As part of this strategy, the government 
should have been prepared to declare a debt service moratorium 
until the negotiations had been completed to its satisfaction. 
The unacceptability of negative growth would have been a key 
element in such a position. 
In the meantime, as.the negotiations might have proceeded, 
tne country might have declared that its debt service would not 
exceed a given proportion of its exports. 
We must comment, on the difficulties - involved in this 
proposal. As ..we said above, it was in the nature ot tne Marcos 
government that it was seeking support from U.S. and the 
international business community. Moreover, in 1983 and most of 
1984, Mexico was still the darling of international community for 
having carried . out a swift IMF-sponsored adjustment program 
(which eventually unraveled). It did not seem fashionable then to 
carry out a nonradically inspired: analysis of any country's 
inherent capability to service its accumulated foreign debt.<19> 
As a counterargument, it must be pointed out that the 
Philippines lived through 1984, Mexico and all, with no 
commercial financing and in 1985 the projected foreign fund 
• * 
inflow did not materialize (see Table 2.3). Instead of working 
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with a mendicant stance on n-nancing that was not available 
ajnyway, the country could have taken a more aggressive dept 
negotiating stance.< 20 > 
1.3 The government should have reduced unecessary and 
avoidable expenditures-. Expenditures related to defense and the 
election exercises would have been of immediate impact. Of longer 
term effect but even more important a program to privatize the 
nonperforming corporations whose debt obligations had been taken 
Over by the government should have been started without delay. 
2.0 The government (and its sponsor, the IMF) should have 
seriously addressed the problem pf credit expansion to those 
sectors whose expansion would have been consistent with economic 
adjustment. This applies particularly to manufactured exports and 
small domestic import-substituting industries. Irt the face of the 
reduction of credit, it might have been most effective tp channel 
it to these industries through a selective credit program. This 
would have permitted exporters to retain their overseas customers 
and exploit the 1984 world export boom and import-substituters to 
take advantage of the devaluations. 
In fact, the credit program that was put in place during the 
period was directed at removing special credit accommodations. 
The Bretton Woods agencies viewed the crisis as the opportunity 
for completing the domestic financial liberalization program, an 
attitude that stemmed from their long experience in the 
recalcitrance of the government. These special accommodations 
16a 
were heavily biased in favor of the large, non-tradeable 
projects^ <21> 
3.0 The government, snouia nave pursued a policy tnat 
combined a devaluation/ say back to 1978 real exchange rate 
level, and temporary export subsidies. A gradual depreciation 
back to 1972 real levels should have been undertaken only when 
sufficient international reserves had been built up. 
The devaluations of October 1983 and June 1984 brought the 
exchange rate back to 1972 levels in one year and induced 
Inflation. A brief experiment with a crawling peg in 1981 had 
been interpreted as a failure as it was soon overtaken by 
currency speculation,<22> This experiment had, however, been 
carried out in the context of a large, and'growing, government 
budget deficit. A more gradual devaluation might have been 
effective in conjunction with the first policy suggestion of 
finding a Solution to the lafge government budget deficit. 
4.0 Instead of the punitive IMF ceilings, which actually 
required that reserve money be restored to its level before the 
May 1984 elections, a growth in reserve money consistent with a 
1.0 percent real growth should have been implemented in 1984. 
Higher monetary ceilings would have been quite acceptable to 
the Marcos government. However, given the past experience, 
attainment of the higher ceilings would not have ensured that Jthe 
additional resources could have been applied, to adjustment, 
especially as would be required in policy suggestion number one. 
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This political judgement/ which the IMF probably does not 
seek to have a reputation of even being capable of making, would 
still not have justified the ceiling based on pre-May 1984 
levels, especially if it was true, as it was, that the inflation 
in 1984 was more immediately caused by the nominal devaluations, 
and not by the increaise in liquidity. The high interest rates and 
massive sales of Central Bank securities in the third quarter of 
1984 were the only recourse if the prior action commitments could 
be met in time for an IMF standby agreement by December 1984.• 
5.0 The disintermediatiOn that characterized the adjustment 
could have been avoided. There should never have been any 
significant issue of interest bearing bills by the Central Bank 
and interest rates should.not have been allowed to shoot up to 
astronomical levels. These policies might have seemed unavoidable 
to the Marcos government when the inflationary process had been 
started and the monetary targets had to be met before the end Of 
1984. In such a situation, a government that had had more 
confidence in its domestic support might have chosen not to meet 
the implicit IMF targets for 1984. 
In hindsight, an economic management that permitted the 
nominal interest rate to be two points higher than actual 
beginning in 1983 and peaking at 20 percent in the last three 
months of the same year would have been an effective policy, as 
we shall show in the simulations that we report below. It is true 
that, after 20 years of domestic interest rates pegged on anti-
usury ceilings, the crisis revealed tne power tnat interest rate 
policy could have in monetary management. 
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All of these suggestions point toward a more early and more 
gradualist stabilization program, witn tne view that adjustment 
will have to toe undertaken over a more extended period. 
We present here some calculations using on a small model of 
the economy in order to illustrate a, more gradualist 
stabilization program. Because of the experience that large macro 
models existing for the Philippine economy have been unable to 
reproduce developments in the economy after 1983, we decided to 
estimate a macroeconometric model based only on data from 1982 to 
1985, the data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
The model specification (and the specification search) was 
heavily influenced toy the discussion in section 2 about the 
actual adjustment experience from 1983-85. The model is estimated 
on monthly data from 1982.10 to 1985.12. For the data on gross 
domestic product, for which only quarterly data is available, the 
data for the quarter is assigned for the three months in that 
quarter, 
The estimated model, mostly estimated by two stage least 
squares, is presented in Table 4.1. For each equation in Table 
4.1 we also present the within sample root mean square error of 
the equation obtained from simulating the whole model dynamically 
within the sample period. Serial correlation was a problem in the 
data set. 
The first equatioji determines the price level. Price level 
declines as output six months ago increases. It increases, in 
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Table 4.1 
WITHIN PERIOD SIMULATION MODEL 
Behavioral Equations; 
(1) P = -215.89 -0,9065 q. fi + 81.13 X +41.45 e 
(162.27) (0.0038) (19.19) C (1.83) 
Estimated by TSLS 
R2 = 0.96 N = 39, 1982.10 to 1985.12 
DW = 0.94 F = 282.3 
SEE = 32.04 Mean of dependent var = 567.4 
W/in sample RMS percent errors 6.1 
bt ^t (2) q^ = 22253.40 + 0.25 { — - 203.74 (—) 
(4556.85) (0.15) t (176.18) t 
Estimated by TSLS corrected for serial correlation 
by Cochrane Orcutt method, p = 0.54 
(0.15) 
R2 = 0.47 N = 39, 1982.10 to 1985.12 
DW = 1.49 F = 12.4 
SEE = 1379.17 Mean of dependent var = 23965.2 
jW/in sample. RMS percent error.: 7.2 
(3) e = -4.27 + 0.015 P + 0.075 i + 0.00034 b 
t (0.94) (0.001) (0,018) (0.00004) 
Estimated by TSLS 
R 2 = 0.96 N = 39, 1982.10 to 1985.12 
DW = i.07 F » 285.7 
SEE =0.81 Mean of dependent var =14.97 
W/in sample RMS percent error: 6.6 
(4) r * 4.26 - 0.018 i 
t (0.41) (0.012) 
Estimated by OLS corrected for serial correlation 
by cochrane-Orcutt method, p = 0.84 
(0.13) 
R2 = 0.68 N « 36, 1983.01 to 1985.12 
DW = 1.20 F = 38.2 
SEE = 0.20 Mean of dependent var =3.94 
W/in sample RMS percent error: 8.3 
(5) m = -1010.73 + 0.221 q - 13.05 e 
11 (1168.74) (0.033) ' (55.27) 
Estimated by TSLS corrected for serial correlation 
by Cochrane-Orcutt method, p = 0.82 
(0.12) 
R2 = 0.84 N = 39, 1982.10 to 1985.12 
DW = 1.79 F = 66.1 
SEE = 260.22 Mean of dependent var = 4325.6 
W/in sample RMS percent error: 10.4 
Variable Definitions 
consumer price index, 1972 = 1C0 
gross domestic product in constant 1972 pesos 
credit multiplier, liquidity/money Supply 
nominal exchange rate, peso's per U.S. dollar 
monetary base, in million pesos 
interest rate on 91 day Treasury Bills 
imports in constant 1972 prices 58a 
monetarist fashion/ when the money multiplier, a measure of 
general credit availability increases. Devaluation exerts 
significant upward pressure on the price level. The nature of the 
latter effect lias been discussed extensively in Taylor [1983] and 
Bruno 11979*3 . 
The second equation gives short-run output, measured by 
quarterly gross domestic product., as function of real monetary 
base and the real interest rate. In this model, mouatary base and 
the interest rate are treated as exogenous variables, independent 
of each mother. The justification is the recent experience in 
which the Central Bank had been able to lead in interest rate 
determination through the sale of its interest bearing bills. 
Furthermore, as shown in the Section 2, the evolution of the 
money supply had become completely tied t o the program ceilings. 
The third equation expresses the exchange rate as a positive 
function of three variables, all highly significam 
statistically: the price , level three months previous, thi 
interest rate, and the monetary base. The first and the thir< 
variables have standard signs. Attempts to estimate the exchang 
rate.as a negative function of the interest rate, to embody th 
Central Bank operation of raising interest to defend the exchang 
rate, failed. 
•f 
The fourth equation embodies all of the monetary Sector fc 
the model and says that the money multiplier is a negati^ 
function of the rate of' interest. The justification is again the 
in the adjustment period, the interest rate was used to contrc 
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total liquidity. Thus, total liquidity is implicitly determined 
from this equation along with the exogenous variable monetary 
base. Because of this equation, equation two is really a 
statement that, output in the short run depends oh real liquidity 
avaiiaDie in tne economy. 
The fifth equation is intended as an import demand equation 
with standard signs. An increase in the exchange rate reduces 
real imports. That it is output six months previous that is the 
activity variable for imports, current output and shorter lags 
having exhibited the negative sign, reflects the intense 
speculation in and the high financing cost of.- imports during the 
period. 
We do not have the: luxury of explaining ttie many other 
alternative specifications that had been tried. We suggest the 
mode,! to be one that embodies the important parameters; in the 
economy during the 1983-85 adjustment and one that fits the 
limited data available adequately. 
The operation, of the main part of the model begins with 
equation 2 which determines current output from the availability 
of current financing. Current prices are then determined through 
equation 1 from demand elements ultimately related to liquidity 
through the money multiplier, cost of imported inputs through the 
exchange rate, and supply of output six months earlier. It is 
implicit in the interdependence of the equations of the model 
tbat output depends on imports which in turn depends on the 
availability of financing. 
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There is a distinctly negative relationship between output 
and prices that is embodied, in the model in line with the short-
run stabilization experience. 
The gradualist counterfactual experiment that is. reported 
here assumes that serious stabilization policy would have begun 
in January 1983, the month when a new IMF program had actually 
begun. 
The policfy instrument used here is the interest rate which 
is peggea two percentage points higher than actual in the 
beginning 6f 1983 and is allowed to rise to 20 percent nominal in 
the last three months of 1983. Subsequently, it is brought down 
gradually to nine percent, nominal by.December 1985. Chart 11 
provides a comparison of actual nominal and the proposed interest 
rates over the simulation period. 
Based on the model, the immediate effect of the policy would 
be on the money multiplier and implicitly on total liquidity. 
Chart 12 shows that under the proposed policy the multiplier 
would be slightly below the base run values for the model until 
April 1984. Beyond this month, the proposed multiplier would stay 
relatively stable at around a value of 4. 
in. this Simulation, the actual values of the money supply. 
Which had been, in the main, consistent with the IMF progran 
targets during the period, have been used. Thus, it w o u K ' b e the 
values of total liquidity that would be inconsistent with the IMI 
program targets. Chart 13 provides a comparison of the actual anc 
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Table 4.2 
Simulation Results 
Consuffler Price Index Exchange Rate flultiplier Iaports Gross Ddsestic Fr 
ar.sonth baserun gradualist baserun gradual i st baserun gradualist baserun gradualist baserun 
1983. or 374.5 377.7 9.9462 10.0930 4.0437 4.0078 4325 4323 25729 
1903.02 371.1 374.2 9.8748 10.0213 4.037B. 4.0019 4256 4254 25270 
19B3.03 373.0 376.1 9.9300 10.0769 .4.0329 3.9969 4197 4195 25065 
1983.n 350.6 355.7 10.0127 10.2061 4.0287 3.9927 5009 5007 25165 
1983.05 364,2 369.4 ID.3460 10.5434 4.0261 3.9892 4966 4963 25279 
1983.06 357.3 363.2 10.1705 10.4001 4.0309 3-9B62 4936 4933 25262 
1993.07 345.9 35B.5 • 9.7319 10.1291 4-.0258 . 3.9469 4673 4581 25222 
19B3.0B 362.9 375.0 10.0864 10.45B0 4.0171 3.9447 4546 4453 250.93 
1903.09 366,6 378.7 10.1558 10.5198 4.0109 3.9429 4481 4389 25119 
1983.10 - 401.1 420.5 11.0185 1L.6110 4.0042 J.9046 4477 4373 25464 
19B3.il 43B.2 456.4 11.94BB 12.4993 3.9945 J.9033 4478 4375 25494 
1983.12 501.2 519.6 13.4819 14.0070 3.9870 3.9022 .4444 4320 25778 
1984.01 496.3 518.4 13.3620 1.3.8334 3.9B39 3.9380 4428 4209 ' 25466 
1994,02 497.1 516.3 13.3953 13.7835 3.9666 J.9373 4392 4200 25034 
1904.03 552.3 571.1 14.7355 15.1176 3.9641 5.9366 4375 4194 24932 
1984.04 569.3 588.8 15.2051 15.4851 3.9617 3.9728 4440 4199 25060 
1984.05 56B.8 582.6 15.2635 15.3661 3.9282 5.9723 4442 4240 24914 
1984.04 612.3 613.5 14.6094 16.1803 3.7993 5.9719 4484 4321 23815 
1984.07 684.0 672.1 IB.5142 17.5557 3.6851 5.9899 4388 4294 23445 
1984.08 665.2 645.7 18.0605 ,16.8751 3.6499 J.9896 4296 4240 23046 
1984.09 674.7 640.3 18.4303 16.7376 3.5707 5.9894 4267 422B 22352 
1984.10 712.7 658.6 19.520B 17.1713 3.4934 1.0259 4264 4310 21823 
1984.11 705.6 M3.6 19,3448 16.8086 3.474B 4.0257 4226 4312 21726 
1984.12 757.2 681.8 20.4039 17.7082 3.4894 4.0256 3991 4269 22169 
1985.01 732.8 652.2 19.5057 17.0463 3.6178 1.0254 3920 4349 22529 
1985.02 703.7 623.2 1B.5B95 16.3289 3.6948 1.0253 3843 4333 22787 
1985.03 745.4 649.8 19.5680 16.9374 3.6525 1.0252 3676 427B 22552 
1985.04 738.4 634.8 19.3406 16.5811 3.6396 (.0252 3562 4290 22514. 
1985.05 709.4 602.5 18.6054 15.7424 3.6505 1.0618 3550 4317 22491. 
1985.06 726.9 616.9 18.9966 16.1224 3.7019 0619 3642 4358 22758 
1985.07 701.6 599.6 18.2409 15.6695 3.8047 4.0617 3731 4313 23266 
1985.08 674. B 581.4 17.4495 15.2194 3.9001 4.0617 3799 4302 23869 
1985.09 691.6 59B.5 17.74B9 15.6155 3.9350 4.0617 3742 4277 24096 
1985.10 671.4 583.8 17.2238 15.2763 3.9515 4.Q616 3741 4301 24215 
1985.11 663.1 576.2 17.0064 15.0651 3.9588 4;0983 3738 4364 24362 
1985.12 743.9 679.7 19.4727 17.5498 3.9624* 4.0983 3765 4315 24B52 
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the proposed values of total liquidity implicit in the gradualist 
simulation. 
The simulation results for the key variables aire given in 
Table 4.2. 
For inflation, the gradualist values are slightly higher 
than the base run values for 1983. Chart 14 depicts the actual, 
base run, and 'gradualist* levels of the consumer price index 
during the simulation period. December 1983 base run inflation 
rate is 33.7 percent while the gradualist value is 39 percent. 
This is due to the higher interest rates in the alternative 
approach for 1983. In the model, higher interest rates are felt 
as higher import financing costs, and translated into higher 
prices. 
The proposed alternative path shows a slightly higher than 
base run inflation rate until June 1984, after which the base run 
price levels are significantly higher than the proposed path. 
(Both the base run and alternative paths show a deflationary 
price trend from January 1985 which does not appear in the actual 
data.) 
From January 1983 thrOugh May 1984, the exchange rate 
depreciates faster in the gradualist compared to.the base run 
path (Chart 15). Beyond this point, the exchange rate shows 
values lower than base run. December 1984 base run exchange rate 
is P19<5 (compared to P19.9 actual) which is higher than P17.7 in 
16a 
the alternative approach. This P2 difference is maintained until 
the end of the simulation period in December 1985. 
The more gradual stabilization policy has its most 
beneficial effect on the real, variables. Gross domestic product 
for 1983., under early but more gradual adjustment, is lower by 
2.6 percent than the corresponding base run level. GDP grows by 
1.8 percent in 1984 as opposed a decline of 6.6 percent in the 
base run and 6.8 percent in the actual, in 1985 there is another 
positive growth of 1.8 percent as opposed to a fall of 1.2 
percent in the base run and 3.8 percent in the actual. In Chart 
16 the level of quarterly real gross domestic product under more 
gradual adjustment is practically constant through the period 
while the actual and the base run values exhibit large drops. 
The same flat pattern is shown for imports, except for the 
year 1983 (Chart 17). For 1983, both the base run and the 
alternative path show an earlier fall in imports than the actual. 
The alternative path is however lower than the base run, by 2.8 
percent in December 1983, as a reflection of the earlier start of 
tne adjustment ror tne gradual strategy. Beyond November 1984, 
alternative path imports are higher than both base run and actual 
valines. 
Imports for the whole year of 1983 are 1.1 percent lower 
under the alternative path compared to the base run pa til. For 
1984, imports are a full 7 percent higher for the alternative 
path; for 1985, imports are 15.5 percent higher compared to the 
corresponding base run values 
16a 
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Table 4.3 
ADDITIONAL FINANCING CALCULATIONS 
(III Million $) 
1983 1984 1985 
Actual: 
Merchandise exports 5,005 5,391 4,629 
Merchandise imports 7 487 6,070 5,111 Merchandise trade balance- -2,482 -679 -vtu 
Current Account Balance -2,750 -1,268 8 
Memo: Target Current Account Balance -2,800 -1,500 -1,300 
Alternative; 
Merchandise imports 
Merchandise trade balance 
Current Account Balance 
6., 533 6,413 6,614 
-1,528 -1,082 -1,985 
-1,796 -1,671 -1,491 
Additional Financing: 
Against actual trade deficit -954 403 1,499 
Against target current 
account balance n.a. 171 
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Let us now compute the additional financing that might have 
been necessary for the alternative path. Let us assume the level 
exports to be what they actually were during the period 1983-85. 
This is a conservative assumption since exports themselves were 
constrained by financing cost during the period. Under this 
assumption, using the inflation and exchange rate results from 
the alternative path, the merchandise trade deficits in 1983, 
1984 and 1985 would have been $1528, $1082, arid $1985 billion 
respectively. 
Compared to the actual merchandise trade deficit these 
alternative import values would have meant financing requirements 
of $954 million less for 1983, $403 million more in 1984 and 
$1499 million more in 1985 (Table 4.3). 
Thus an additional net financing requirment of $948 million 
ovr three years would have been required by the alternative path 
for merchandise trade alone. Given that bv end 1985, $1.74 
billion of the trade facility had remain unused, there seemed to 
have been sufficient resources for the alternative strategy. In 
fact, the economy was so extremely depressed that by 30 September 
1986 $1.66 billion of the trade facility remained as deposits 
with the Central Bank. Between 1984 and 1985 alone, the 
additional financing required would have been $1802 million. Even 
assuming that the reduced financing requirement' for 1983 •h^d' not 
materialized, this would only have meant an additional financing 
requirement of $100 million for the years 1984 and 1985. 
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The suggested approach is "still monetarist, since it relies 
on; credit control. However, the model that is used embodies the 
cost push elements that had a strong impact in the period of the 
1983-85 adjustment. These results suggest that an abrupt monetary 
correction should be avoided in such an economy. 
The suggested approach would only have been feasible in 
conjunction with the other elements that we suggested above. In 
particular, significant progress in solving the government budget 
deficit-government corporate contributions problem would have to 
be made. In this problem, strong legal actions -and negotiating 
stances usually associated with unorthodox adjustment policies, 
would have to have been undertaken. 
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5.0 Some Lessons from the Experience 
Let- us sum up here some of the elements that were part of 
the 1983-85 adjustment experience in the Philippines. 
1. The first lesson is that for an economy such as that of 
the Philippines where labor and other human costs of operating 
the economy's production processes do not adjust to (or through) 
inflation,<23> a monetarist program which depends on the 
constriction, of credit to solve the external imbalance 
(stabilization) is effective. 
2. When such a monetarist program does work in an economy 
such as. the Philippines, it Works with a vengeance.because of 
features that are present in the economy. §ince working capital 
is the first to be constrained and since such capital tends to be 
almost wholly raised from the financial, system, a monetarist 
program will immediately shut down the manufacturing sector and 
reduce imports. 
However, the raising of working capital finance cost and the 
increase in its local currency cost induce inflation even as real 
liquidity is declining drastically. General inflation unmatched 
by income increases leads to reduced real incomes and reduced 
domestic demand. 
3. A monetarist program that works through the constriqfcion 
of credit has very poor chance of inducing a real adjustment 
because of the very fact that it kills off investment. In an 
economy such as the Philippines, where as much as 70 percent of 
16a 
GDP can toe classified as nontradeables, an enormous amount of 
j . 
investment is required to increase the domestic production of 
tradeables. But tight financial credit will not permit this to 
occur. 
4. The cost on the human population of such a program is 
enormous. Table 5.1 reports On the weight for height status of 
preschoolers in the Philippines in 1984 and 1985. In one year, 
there was an increase from 13.3 to 14.3 percent in preschoolers 
who fell less than 85 percent of the weight-height standard. As 
would be expected for a country with a large nontradeable sector 
located in cities, the same statistic shows an increase from 8.8 
percent to 14.4 percent in the national capital region (NCR) of 
Manila. The human tradeoff against a program that did not put in 
place a real adjustment is deeply negative. 
5. The IMF must work with the government currently in 
power. Even though the IMF has an overall framework which, at 
least hypothetically, 'will work' in some fashion such a 
framework is often not completely implemented. This was 
especially evident in the 1984 portion of the adjustment program 
even though it was not officially under the IMF; but it was also 
true in 1985. Parts of the agenda that are in the interest of the 
government in power will be implemented? parts that are not will 
be amended or not implemented at all. The actual resulting 
program will be in the interest of the. government, which is not 
necessarily consistent with any real success in adjustment. 
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Table 5.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF PRESCHOOLERS BY WEIGHT-FOR-HEIGHT STATUS (WH) 
BY REGION, 1984 AND 1985 
Less than 85% of WH Standard Greater than 85% of Tffl Standard 
1985 1984 1985 1984 
Region No. % No. % NO. % No. % 
Ilocos 54 17.2 63 20.6 260 32.8 243 79.4 
Cagayan Valley 41 12.1 31 8.6 298 87.9 330 91.4 
C. Luzon 67 16.8 82 24.2 332 83.2 257 75.'8 
S. Tagalog 71 19.6 52 15.3 292 80.4 288 84.7 
Bicol 50 18.7 21 10.6 218 81.3 177 89.4 
W. Visayas 38 13.8 44 20.1 237 86.2 175 79.9 
C. Visayas 18 6.1 14 5.6 277 93.9 23 94.4 
E. Visayas 29 11.5 26 15.5 223 88.5 142 84.5 
W. Mindanao 8 5.3 12 9.2 144 94.7 119 90.8 
N. Mindanao 16 10.7 14 10.3 134 89.3 122 89.7 
S. Mindanao 14 to . to 18 14.8 101 87.8 104 85.2 
C. Mindanao 16 9.3 20 9.8 156 90 ..7 185 90.2 
NCR (Metro 
Manila) 
19 8.8 43 14.4 198 91.2 256 85.6 
NATIONAL 441 13.3 440 14.3 2,870 86.7 2,634 85.7 
Source: National Nutrition Council Survey, 1984 and 1985. 
67a 
The element that would have been a key ingredient in an IMF 
prdgram which the Marcos government found ways to suppress is the 
private sector response. In fact, the program in the Philippines 
channeled private sector resources away from investment that 
might have increased the production of tradeables and directly 
into the financing of government requirements and debt service. 
Even assuming for the sake •of argument that the IMF economic 
model is correct, it is highly unlikely that any government in 
the Philippines will accept the IMF monetary model as being 
completely applicable to the Philippines. As shown in the recent 
experience, in a very authoritarian government, it will be very 
possible to religiously fulfill program targets while killing off 
the very private sector which the IMF approach places so much 
reliance on. As an organization whose terms of reference are to 
deal with governments, it can be futile for the IMF to attempt to 
suggest that the government,implement its competitive model. 
The end result of such cross purposes in the case of the 
recent Philippine experience is that the IMF targets were 
achieved, stabilization was attained, and, but for the fact that 
the government was eventually overthrown, the members of the 
government succeeded ire protecting their economic interests. 
Thus, the two active parties in the program - the IMF and the 
government - manage to protect their own interest while the 
nonparticipants bear the cost. 
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The prospects for the Philippine economy for the rest of the 
decade of the 1980s are not bright. The recent adjustment program 
left many of the old industries at 40 percent capacity 
utilization and induced iCORs hovering around -4 for 1984 and 
1985 and over 40 in 1986 when the- first nonzero GNP growth rate 
was attained. The destruction of many of the old industrial 
operations that occurred during the adjustment program suggests 
that ICORs in the near future will be high. 
It is unlikely that the country will recover the investment 
ratios approaching 0.3 that it achieved in the 1970s. Even if an 
investment ratio of 0.2 were achieved, an ICOR of 8 would only 
permit an income growth rate of 2.5 percent, which is only 
slightly below the 2.6 population growth rate. An ICOR. of 4, the 
historical ICOR from 1960 to 1980, will permit 5 percent annual 
growth.<24> If such a growth rate can be sustained until 1990 
then percapita income in 1990 would be 13.7 percent lower than it 
was in 1980. 
The key"^  faptor behind increasing the investment ratio is the 
debt service. With an average growth rate of around 5 percent per 
year, interest service will average 8 to 10 percent of GNP for 
the rest of the decade. By basing its negotiating stance on the 
standard 18-month IMF standby, the new Aquino administration has 
chosen the orthodox strategy to deal with this problem. To Reduce 
its net debt service burden to around 4 or 5 percent of GNP, it 
is. negotiating for a growth facility with the.commercial banks 
and the multilateral finance agencies. 
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Footnotes 
<l>See also Bello and Others [1982]. 
<2>There is some evidence that the country's oil purchasing 
operation was a channel through which the capital flight of the 
Marcos family had been carried out. 
<3>San Miguel Corporation, a beverage and processed food 
conglomerate. 
<4>The coconut industry program had managed to replant 55,000 
hectares. 
<5>See also Table 1.2. 
<6>Lamberte, Montes and Others [1985]. 
<7>The IMF program targets were updated during the program 
reviews in the period. The value of the original table is that 
the Philippine government attempted to religiously fulfill the 
monetary targets in the November 1984 table even when the targets 
for the endogenous variables in that table were being 'seriously 
missed or overachieved. 
<8>Quote from the telex from the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance and the Central Bank governor to the IMF, multilateral 
finance agencies, and the commercial banks dated 2 November 1984. 
<9>The latter election was actually first announced in the U.S. -
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in a television interview Marcos had with David Brinkley. 
<10>The week after the 7 February 1986 election the Central Bank 
implemented the same strategy, mopping P15 billion in one week, 
which is about 40.5 percent of the outstanding reserve money at 
that time. The purpose was to meet the 1986 first quarter 
monetary targets of the IMF program. But at this point the regime 
had only two weeks of life. 
<ll>He eventually resigned his post in the financial institution. 
<12>The nature of this long standing problem is discussed in 
Bello and Others [1982]. 
<13>After the nickname of the Central Bank governor. 
<14>See Lamberte, Montes, and Others [1985], pp. 15-16. 
<15>In fact, military officers, acting in their private capacity 
with the clearance of their superiors, accompanied the shipments. 
<16>See Lamberte, Montes, and Others [1985]. 
<17>If Mr. Marcos had managed to stay in power after that period, 
a general crackdown on the 'legal opposition' was widely 
expected. 
<13> Of . course, it should have commenced in 1979, after the 
second oil shock or in 1974, after the first oil shock. 
<19>Such an analysis has now become fashionable in the academic 
community, but unfortunately not so in the Bretton Woods 
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agencies. 
<20>Even with the new Aquino government, the taking of a more 
aggressive negotiating stance continues to be an issue.-
<21>In fact the Development Bank of the Philippines lent more for 
real estate development projects than to agriculture. 
<22^he IMF program which began in January 1983 was also intended 
to help ward, off the speculation against the currency. 
<23>Such as in TaylOr [1983], Chapter 5. 
<24>Some more detailed calculations are reported in Montes 
[1986]. 
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